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On August 18, 2002, the New York Times announced
that it would soon begin publishing same-sex union
announcements on par with those of heterosexual weddings.'
Bowing to "a growing and visible trend in society toward public
celebrations of commitment by gay and lesbian couples," the
Times decided to select qualified couples according to "the
newsworthiness and accomplishments of the couples and their
families,"2 the same basis on which it selects heterosexual
couples. "Qualified" couples are those who "[c]elebrate their
commitment in a public ceremony" or "[elnter into a legally
recognized civil union (currently available only in Vermont) or
register their domestic partnership (in those localities,
including New York City, that offer registration)." With this
step, the New York Times became the first major metropolitan
daily to offer access to social announcement pages to gay men
and lesbians on the same terms as heterosexuals.4 True to its
word, the inaugural same-sex union announcement appeared
in the New York Times on September 1, 2002.'
This milestone occurred after a decade of concerted
effort by individuals and organizations to obtain for same-sex
couples equal treatment by newspapers in their society pages.
While other newspapers preceded the Times in publishing
same-sex announcements, the Times, the "newspaper of record"
and arguably the most influential newspaper in the country,
has set an impressive precedent. Additional papers have begun
1 Times Will Begin Reporting Gay Couples' Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2002, at A30.
2 Id.
3Id.
4 According to the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation ("GLAAD"),
as of December 20, 2002, 180 newspapers offer equal access to the weddings section.
See GLAAD, Announcing Equality Project: Newspapers that Publish Same-Sex Union
Announcements, at http://www.glaad.org/campaigns/announcing-equality/newspaper-
-list (last visited Dec. 27, 2002). This figure is out of approximately 1,600 daily
newspapers. Gay Unions to Appear in Sentinel, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2002, at
C3. It is unclear what is meant by "equal access" in this context, since several
newspapers on the list-such as the Boston Globe-segregate same-sex union
announcements into different sections from heterosexual announcements. The New
York Times intermingles gay and heterosexual announcements on the same pages.
5 Daniel Gross, Steven Goldstein, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, § 9, at 12. For a
behind-the-scenes account, see Troy Masters, You May Now Break the Glass: The Inside
Scoop on The Times' First Gay Wedding Announcement, GAY CITY NEWS, Sept. 6, 2002,
available at http://www.gaycitynews.com/GCN15/youmay.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2002). The first announcement from a lesbian couple appeared the following week. See
Leslie Miller and Alicia Salzer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, § 9, at 12.
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following suit.6 This achievement is both remarkable and
laudable.
Other newspapers, however, will undoubtedly continue
in their traditional practices of exclusion. Some of these
exclusionary papers will be accused in court and in the public
forum of unlawful discrimination.7  Reflexively, those
newspapers will erect a defensive shield from those charges by
appealing, at least in part, to the First Amendment. Since the
First Amendment traditionally protects newspapers from any
government interference in editorial content, this defense, at
first blush, appears sound. This Article, however, questions the
merits of that defense and concludes that although courts
instinctively defer to the press, alternative factual and policy
analyses could produce a different outcome, one which would
render unlawful a newspaper's exclusionary practices.
This Article begins in Part I by sketching the history of
interactions between newspapers and the gay community. A
recurring touchstone of reality for this Article's analysis is a
complaint of discrimination filed against the Times-Picayune,
New Orleans's major daily newspaper. This Part recounts the
background of that story, as well as newspapers' prior
responses to requests to publish same-sex union
6 Michael Bronski, Mergers and Acquisitions: Getting on the Times'
Weddings Page, BOSTON PHOENIX, Aug. 22, 2002, available at http://www.bostonphoen-
ix.comr/news-features/this-just-in/documents/0204899.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002)
("The Times is a leader and a bellwether for other papers, [so] the effect of their
decision' may be wide-ranging. Indeed, within a couple of years we may see every other
paper in the country doing the same thing.") (quoting Robert Dodge, Board President
for the National Lesbian and Gay Journalists' Association). For example, five days
after the New York Times announcement, the Orlando Sentinel adopted a similar
policy. Gay Unions to Appear in Sentinel, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2002, at C3.
Notable additions to the list have been the Boston Globe and The Oregonian. According
to GLAAD, when the New York Times made its announcement in August, it knew of
approximately seventy newspapers with similar policies. See GLAAD, GLAAD
Launches Announcing Equality Project, at http://www.glaad.org/org/campaigns/ann-
ouncing-equality/newspaper-ust.php (Last visited Nov. 25, 2002). By the end of
December, the number had more than doubled, demonstrating the power of the Times's
example.
, Only one appellate level case presents issues roughly analogous to those
considered in this Article, Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). In
Cook, the plaintiff sued to have an Alabama newspaper accept for publication his
wedding announcement. He sought to have the announcement included on the white-
only society page and "not the black page." Id. at 1120 (emphasis omitted). The Fifth
Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction "over the content and arrangement of the society
pages of a newspaper" and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint. Id.
Because Cook based his complaint on a theory of contract, rather than the issues of
discrimination and First Amendment protections addressed here, the case offers little
insight into the current problem.
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announcements on equitable terms with those offered
heterosexual couples.
The Article then discusses the need for equal treatment
of same-sex society announcements. Part II identifies the
interests at stake in the debate over whether same-sex union
announcements should appear in local newspapers. It asserts
that the public recognition that accrues through such
announcements is a necessary constituent of any healthy and
enduring romantic relationship, and that denial of public
recognition exposes gay couples to an increased risk of
dissolution.
Part III examines claims of discriminatory exclusion
that occur under a public accommodations law that protects
sexual orientation asserted against a newspaper. The threshold
issue is whether newspapers fall within the scope of a "public
accommodation."8 To date, no court has held a newspaper to be
a public accommodation. Assuming this jurisprudential trend
continues, claims of discriminatory exclusion presumably will
be resolved in favor of the newspaper because the basis for the
complaints does not reach to that institution.
However, if newspapers are indeed public
accommodations, proper resolution of the discrimination
dispute will focus on the kind of speech embodied in a society
announcement. Part IV parses the different analytical
approaches courts use to examine speech and public
accommodation. Specifically, if announcements are not "news,"
then one kind of analysis is appropriate, but if they are "news,"
a different tack is required. Finally, this Article concludes in
Part V that whether a newspaper can be compelled to accept
and publish same-sex union announcements is a fact-intensive
issue dependent upon specific local conditions, and cannot be
decided universally by appeal to either the Free Press or Free
Speech Clauses of the Constitution.
8 A public accommodation is statutorily defined in the relevant jurisdiction.
As a general concept,
[t]he appropriate object of public accommodations law... is an establishment
in which minimal association exists between proprietor and customers, and
in which the service relation is brief, casual and routine. In addition, the
establishment provides a service necessary to the public, and a high degree of
competition exists among establishments of the same kind. Typically, public
accommodations cater to nearly all of the public, indicating that significant
associational interests are nonexistent.
Pamela Griffin, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment
Limitations upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1055 (1985) (citations omitted).
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I. TRADITIONAL NEWSPAPER POLICIES
Most important policy debates fail to pay adequate
attention to the historical and cultural specifics that preceded
the moment of the current discussion. That failure causes
many nuances to be missed, particularly the trends pertinent
to the debate, which develop over time. The respective
relationships between the principal actors are typically already
well established, and these prior interactions color the
perspective and understanding of the immediate issue.
Interactions between a newspaper and the gay members of its
community are no exception. Their relations often were
troubled and adversarial long before anyone raised the
question of same-sex union announcements.9
In that spirit, this discussion takes as its real-life focus
the details of a complaint a lesbian couple lodged against their
local newspaper. In 1994, Donna Bird and Leslie Nehring
submitted material to the Times-Picayune, the sole daily
newspaper for the New Orleans area, for publication in its
wedding section.0 The editor of the Living section forwarded
this request to James Amoss, the Editor-in-Chief. Although
Amoss told the couple that the Times-Picayune "does not have
guidelines for 'this type' of announcement,"" he nevertheless
declined their request," stating that "such publication was not
in the Picayune's best interest at this time." 4
Believing this rejection to be discriminatory, Bird and
Nehring took their complaint to the New Orleans Human
Relations Commission ("NOHRC"). The NOHRC notified the
Times-Picayune that a complaint had been filed charging the
newspaper for violations of then Chapter 40C of the City Code
of New Orleans. 5 The Times-Picayune rebutted this charge,
9 Edward Alwood's STRAIGHT NEWS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA
(1996), provides a thorough account of this developing relationship. Much of the
historical detail outlined in this section was gleaned from his engrossing work.10 New Orleans Human Relations Commission, Charge of Discrimination No.
1024940001 (Feb. 6, 1995) [hereinafter "NOHRC Charge"].
" Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction Ex. B, Affadavit of James Amoss, at 3, Times Picayune Publ'g
Corp. v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A95-518N, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4842 (La. App.
4th Cir. April 13, 1995).
12 NOHRC Charge, supra note 10, at 2.
13 Amoss Memorandum at 3.
14 NOHRC Charge, supra note 10, at 1.
" CITY CODE OF NEW ORLEANS, art. III, § 40C-102(1) (amended and
recodified as § 86-33). The analysis below will proceed under the new version of the
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arguing that the complaint constituted a "frontal assault on the
First Amendment freedoms generally and the freedom and
independence of the press in particular."' 6
The Times-Picayune's defenses are archetypical of the
kinds of arguments asserted by newspapers charged with
discrimination against same-sex couples. Similarly, the Times-
Picayune example is representative of the dynamic relationship
between a newspaper and the gay members of its reader
community. Details from that example inform this review of
the sociohistorical background of the debate over same-sex
union announcements.
A. On the Words "Gay" and "Homosexual"
One could tell the story of the relationship between
newspapers and the gay members of their local communities
using any number of devices. This section selects as its theme
the attitude toward the very words--"gay" and "homosexual"-
themselves.
The term "homosexual" was coined in 1869 as a hybrid
of Greek and Latin. 7 "Gay," by contrast, did not develop its
current meaning until 1935.18 As "homosexual" came to be
viewed as a term of derision, as an archaic term or simply as an
overly medical/technical term limited to sexual acts alone, 9
"gay," with its positive connotations of a fuller lifestyle beyond
mere sexuality, became the preferred term within the
community.20 As the terms developed, "homosexual" described
what a person did, while "gay" described who a person was:
"Gay [has come] to represent a commitment to personal and
social change, as well as a life-style-a personality and identity
that marked a proud, self-determined social and political
ordinance, which was adopted June 17, 1999, many years after the NOHRC charge.
16 Amoss Memorandum at 2.
17 Wayne R. Dynes & Warren Johansson, Homosexual (Term), in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY 555 (Wayne R. Dynes ed., 1990).
18 Scott Speirs, Gay, in GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
362, 363 (George E. Haggerty ed., 2000).
19 See, e.g., James M. Donovan, Homosexual, Gay, and Lesbian: Defining the
Words and Sampling the Populations, 24(1/2) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 27, 33-40 (1992)
[hereinafter Defining the Words] (recording the perceptions of gays that the word
"homosexual" refers only to sexual acts).
20 Speirs, supra note 18, at 363 ("By the time of the Stonewall riots, gay was
the dominant term of expressing their sexual identity for a group of younger, more
overtly political homosexual activists, who formed groups such as the Gay Liberation
Front."); see also Donovan, Defining the Words, supra note 19, at 40-41.
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territory. Homosexual, on the other hand, stood for repression
and a lack of gay consciousness."2
The Ninth Circuit case of One, Inc. v. Olesen22 reflects
the early media attitude toward all things homosexual. In
Olesen, the postmaster refused to deliver a magazine of
political and social interest because it targeted. gay men and
lesbians. His rationale was that any material treating the topic
of homosexuality was obscene per se. The publisher brought
suit seeking an injunction against the postmaster's failure to
deliver. 3 The district court denied the injunction, ruling that
the magazine was obscene and thus non-mailable material.24
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.25 In 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed Olesen without opinion. This court victory was the
first occasion in American history that newspapers such as the
New York Times printed positive news about homosexuals. 7
After this reversal, simply discussing the topic of, or using the
words for, homosexuality could no longer be legally proscribed
as an obscene act.
21 RODGER STREITMATTER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN
PRESS 83-84 (1995). The National Lesbian & Gay Journalists Association provides a
"Stylebook Addenda of Gay/Lesbian Terminology" for use by newspapers, at
http://www.nlgja.org/pubs/style.html. According to this document, "homosexual" is
appropriate for "medical or sexual contexts." All other contexts should use "gay":
An adjective that has largely replaced "homosexual" in referring to men who
are sexually and affectionately attracted to other men . . . . For women,
"lesbian" is preferred. To include both, use "gay men and lesbians." In
headlines where space is an issue, gay(s) is acceptable to describe both.
NAT'L LESBIAN & GAY JOURNALISTS ASS'N, STYLEBOOK ADDENDA OF GAY/LESBIAN
TERMINOLOGY, at http://www.nlgja.org/pubs/style.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
22 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957). Historical details of the
Olesen case are available from STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 31-36.
'3 Olesen, 241 F.2d at 773.24 Id. at 775.
25 Id. at 779.
26 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958). The reversal was based
presumptively on the reasoning ofRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1958), wherein
obscenity was restricted to materials for the prurient interest of the consumer.
Obviously, many persons would argue that homosexuality by definition fell within this
construct of obscenity. The Court offered no explanation or analysis clarifying why this
belief would be erroneous. The per curiam reversal of Olesen was one of three the Court
granted after Roth, all without comment. The other two were Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) and Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957).
Harry Kalven interprets this unusual action as suggesting that "the Court [felt] the
pressure ... to restrict obscenity to the worthless and hence to something akin to hard-
core pornography. Thus the three decisions appear to add an important gloss to the
Roth definition." Harry Kalven, Jr., Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, in
COMMENTARIES ON OBSCENITY 89, 125 (Donald B. Sharpe ed., 1970).
27 STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 36.
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This result, however, affected only the legal freedom to
use the term in print. It did little to change the ongoing in-
house custom of newspapers to refuse to print even the words
"gay" or "homosexual." 8 In 1969, the Village Voice declined to
accept an advertisement containing the word "gay," "despite
the newspaper's willingness to accept apartment ads that
specified No Gays."29 Activists successfully pressured the paper
to rescind the ban on both "gay" and "homosexual.""
The Los Angeles Times-which used the word "fag" as
late as 1974 31-changed a similar ban in 1969. The paper
revised its policy only after being threatened with a letter
writing campaign to the FCC that would have had serious
economic implications for the newspaper. 2 The New York
Times officially banned "gay" in 1975."8 "The only exception to
[the] rule would be when the word was used in direct quotes or
when it was part of the official name of an organization." 4 The
ban remained in effect until 1987, although even then the
paper refused to use "gay" as a noun.35 In 1978, the Wall Street
Journal instituted a similar style rule to the effect that the
paper was to use "homosexual" instead of the community-
Newspapers were not the only institution to avoid the use of these words.
In 1970, the Gay Activists Alliance was refused a certificate of incorporation because
"the organization could not use the term gay in its name." ALWOOD, supra note 9, at
108. The concern over words showed up in other areas as well. The Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, a Jewish watchdog group, threatened in 1985 to sue the newly
formed Gay and Lesbian Anti-Defamation League for copyright infringement. See id. at
236. The U.S. Olympic Committee brought a similar suit over the use of the word
"Olympic" by the Gay Olympics. See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of
Commercial Speech, 57 MD. L. REV. 55, 99-100 (1999).
ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 91; see also STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 124.
This hypocrisy continues today. Newspapers that have no problem accepting personal
ads from gay men and lesbians "suddenly become concerned and moral when gays and
lesbians want to announce to the world, as do straight people, their undying love for
each other." Letter from Jay Crowell to editor of Boston Globe (Aug. 6, 2002), in
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2002, at A14.
30 See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 92. Ironically, the Village Voice would later
become the "first employer in the nation to sanction benefits for same-sex partners." Id.
at 202.
31 See id. at 6, 330 n.15 (referring to Susan Banashek & Al Martinez, Night
Shoppers-Fantasy in the Market Aisle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1974, at Al).
32 See id. at 95.
33 See id. at 162.
l' Id.
31 See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 230-31. A more recent summary of the New
York Times's style policy is "to use 'gay' when referring to social and political issues
and 'homosexual' when referring to clinical or psychological issues." Lawrence
Ingrassia, Fighting Words: Gay, Lesbian Groups Seek to Expunge Bias They See in
Language, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1993, at Al (quoting Allan M. Siegal, assistant
managing editor of the New York Times).
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preferred "gay," a rule not lifted until 1984.6 A small anecdote
illustrates the tenor of the times: as late as 1978, "the U.S.
Department of Commerce rejected Gayweek's application to
receive a trademark for its name, stating that the newspaper
was 'immoral and scandalous.' 37
Newspapers continued to refuse to accept commercial
advertisements with the words "gay" and "lesbian" as late as
1990."8 Not unrelatedly, the AIDS epidemic "did not make the
front page of an American newspaper until May 31, 1982,"39
even though the Centers for Disease Control had identified it
almost a year before4' and even though it had been front-page
news in gay community newspapers since July 1981.41
The historical trend can be summarized as an initial
reticence by newspapers to speak about gay men and lesbians
at all, or at least in anything but derogatory terms. When they
did address the issue, they insisted on the use of "homosexual"
instead of the community-preferred "gay." Only in the last
decade have the majority of newspapers agreed to use "gay" as
the ordinary term, acceding to both a community's right to self-
label, and the common parlance in the broader community. On
its face, this development could indicate nothing deeper than
the stylistic inertia of staid institutions, which prefer to trail,
rather than lead, language development.42 Other research,
however, places this historical finding of lexical patterns into
broader sociological context.
An analysis of word choice through 1986 documented an
increase over time of the use of "gay" in instances where
writers formerly would have used "homosexual," a preference
for "homosexual" by persons with a negative attitude toward
gay men and lesbians and a preference for "homosexual" in
formal contexts (such as academic writing) as compared with
"gay" in the informal venues.42 One implication of this study is
36 See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 171-72. As of 1993, the Wall Street Journal's
policy discouraged use of gay as a noun. See Ingrassia, supra note 35.
31 STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 241.
31 See, e.g., Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 459 N.W.2d
873, 875 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
39 ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 218.
40 Id. at 212.
41 STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 248. The paper was the New York Native.
42 For example, the New York Times was slow to accept the title "Ms." See
Susan Ager, Times Opens Its Pages to Gay Couples, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 20,
2002, available at http://www.freep.com/news/metro/ager20-20020820.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2003).
43 See Donovan, Defining the Words, supra note 19, at 33-37.
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that word choice is not arbitrary, but rather systematically
reflects other forces including dynamic usage changes, stylistic
contrasts and, most importantly, attitudes toward the
referenced population.
The historical reticence of newspapers to use the word
"gay" mirrors the deliberate language choice of the opponents
of gays' rights." That fact alone would exacerbate tensions
between newspapers and the gay community. But as Edward
Alwood's history45  more than adequately shows, the
convergence of language and attitude in the case of newspapers
is not accidental, but real. Newspapers tended to be adversarial
toward gay men and lesbians, either through deliberate animus
or through ignorance of the harm they were inflicting46 when
they refused to use the word that connoted to the community a
positive, or at least non-condemnatory attitude. The good news
is that newspapers have proven themselves to be educable on
the issues involved, and ready to amend their practices when
they learned they were inflicting needless anguish.47 As
See, e.g., William C. Duncan, "A Lawyer Class": Views on Marriage and
"Sexual Orientation" in the Legal Profession, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 137 (2001). In this
article, Duncan, Assistant Director for Catholic University's Marriage Project, sought
to show how the legal profession has become intolerant of discrimination against gay
men and lesbians. In his view, this intolerance is not entirely a good thing, as it leads
to "a corruption of the political process that could threaten marriage and democracy."
Id. at 182.
Our attention goes to his use of language to convey his negative
assessment of the worth of gay men and lesbians. Scare quotes are consistently used
for the following terms: openly gay, sexual orientation, same-sex marriage and gay
rights. Scare quotes diminish the reality of the word. Note the derogatory difference
between the observation that William is a Christian, and the comment that William is
a "Christian."
Directly in keeping with the present analysis, Duncan uses "homosexual"
forty-five times, as located through the FOCUS function of LEXIS. "Gay" appears 118
times, in apparent contradiction to the expected language use by an opponent of civil
rights for gay men and lesbians. However, after subtracting quotes by others, names of
organizations or articles, and the scare quote uses, Duncan uses 'gay" in a
nonderogatory manner of his own volition no more than ten times.
It should be emphasized that it is not the word "homosexual" that carries
negative connotations, but instead its use in inappropriate contexts, and its
disproportionate use relative to the community-preferred "gay." I use the word
"homosexual" in this Article; its use is not argued to be utterly verboten.
45 See generally ALWOOD, supra note 9.
'6 The fact of this historical animus from newspapers against homosexuals
contains more than a little irony because today "[pro-family organizations believe the
... media is hopelessly biased in favor of homosexuality." Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply so
Different". The Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 KY. L.J. 997, 1065 n.337 (2001).
47 Ignorance and animus are not limited to newspapers. Indeed, gay couples
have their relationships disrespected on a continual basis by, among others,
corporations and the government. At no time was this more clear than after the attacks
2003]
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newspapers' attitudes have become more open and accepting,
their language has likewise shifted.
The language use of the Times-Picayune follows this
general pattern. The LEXIS database for this newspaper
begins in 1991. The occurrences of "gay" and "homosexual" in
each year are as follows:
11991 1 1992 1 1993 1 1994 1 1995 11996 1 1997 1 1998 I 1999 1 2000 I2001
Gay 2 1 11 10 667 651 671 1565 607 1959 767 582
Homosexual 0 0 211 145 137 118 79 81 105 57 48
Two factors frustrate any reliance upon the absolute
value of these numbers. First, many instances of "gay" are
names of persons, and hence are not true hits. All three "gay"
hits from 1991 and 1992 fall into this category. Second, it is
hard to believe that 1991 and 1992 include the full contents of
the paper. Otherwise, the lower figures for those years would
mean that the Times-Picayune literally never wrote on the gay
community in any way, including in reference to AIDS. The
hits for "AIDS" for these two years, incidentally, are 0 and 1
respectively, further suggesting that the database coverage is
incomplete. The number of meaningful "gay" hits, therefore, is
something less than the value expressed by the table.
Still, despite these limitations, a clear pattern emerges.
Use of "gay" increased over this ten-year span, while use of
"homosexual" drastically decreased. This pattern is explained,
under the present analysis, by three possible circumstances:
the newspaper has moved toward less formal speech, the
newspaper has adopted a more pro-gay stance, or the increase
merely reflects the linguistic changes inevitably occurring over
time. No evidence suggests the first factor, and the documented
of September 11, 2001. Surviving partners of the gay and lesbian victims of that fateful
day have been denied the support, both financial and emotional, that employers and
governmental agencies have rushed to extend to partners of the heterosexual dead. See
Victoria Scanlan Stefanakos, Life Goes On, ADVOC., Jan. 22, 2002, at 48-51; Denny Lee,
Partners of Gay Victims Find the Law Calls Them Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001,
§14, at 4; Brooke A. Masters, Virginia Law Denies Benefits to Domestic Partners of
Sept. 11 Attack Victims, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at C3. So uncertain has been the
possibility of aid to gay couples that a separate fund has been established for their
protection. See Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Press
Conference to Announce Establishment of"September 11 Gay & Lesbian Family Fund"
(Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record-
?record=934 (last visited Jan. 4, 2003). The Special Master of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, Kenneth Feinberg, did, in the end, award compensation to
at least one survivor of a lesbian couple. See Steve Vogel, U.S. Awards Lesbian 9/11
Benefits for Loss of Partner, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at B1. The refusal of
newspapers to recognize gay relationships as sufficiently worthy to merit space on the
society pages is but one in a long line of indignities.
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changes are too significant and sudden to be accounted for
solely by inevitable change. Therefore, the most reasonable
hypothesis under these facts is that in the last ten years the
editorial policy of the Times-Picayune discernibly has shifted
from language that either reflected a negative editorial stance,
or at least mimicked that stance, toward a more genuinely
favorable representation of gay men and lesbians in its news
coverage.
This brief synopsis suggests that newspapers have
learned important lessons from their earlier negative
treatment of gay men and lesbians, and are prepared to treat
them more sensitively than they have in former decades. The
typical newspaper, then, can be expected to exclude
announcements of same-sex unions from its society pages not
because of blatant homophobia, but rather for two reasons.
First, the newspaper may not be aware of the importance of
this access. Second, although the paper itself may have no
principled objection to the inclusion of such announcements, a
newspaper may fear reader and advertiser reaction."
Awareness of the likely source of newspapers' failure to include
same-sex announcements could generate productive strategic
responses on the part of activists, and could also inform the
development of appropriate legal analyses.
B. On Publication of Same-Sex Union Announcements
1. Pre-New York Times Reactions
Examination of the Times-Picayune word-use table in
the previous section justifies an inference that the achievement
of equitable treatment of gays by newspapers has been gradual.
Overt reference to gay men and lesbians increased
incrementally, suggesting that official recognition was slow but
steady. In fact, newspapers largely ignored gays until the AIDS
epidemic,49 and when newspapers finally paid attention for
purposes of AIDS coverage, that attention did not readily
extend to the wider range of issues important to the gay
community. Newspapers ignored historical events in gay
48 For an account of how earlier reader reaction changed newspaper policy
toward gays, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49 The first front page article about gays did not run in the New York Times
until 1963, in which "the nation's newspaper of record described them as 'deviates' who
were 'condemned to a life of promiscuity.'" See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 6. For a
description of the media response to AIDS, see id., especially chapters 11-12.
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history, such as the first demonstrations at the White House
and the Pentagon. ° Many periodicals ignored the events of
Stonewall, reporting them only months afterward.5
Newspapers regularly eliminated gay-related content from
public speeches and events.52 After newspapers more regularly
began to cover political and social issues important to the gay
community, a new front opened on the treatment of partners in
the obituaries of those who had died from AIDS complications."
That front has progressed to the society pages.
A Portland, Oregon court ruling illustrates the problem
generating the present discussion of same-sex union
announcements.54  Portland has an ordinance forbidding
discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation.5' The Oregonian, Portland's local paper, refused to
accept a same-sex wedding announcement "based on dictionary
definitions of 'wedding' and 'marriage.'" 6 Opponents of The
Oregonian's policy sued and the newspaper argued that the
state and federal constitutions "protect its right to decide not to
publish same-sex wedding announcements."" The state district
judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
against the paper. Significantly, the court implied that the
wedding announcement pages are "news space" and that
"[there is no precedent holding news space to be a 'public
accommodation.""'8 If the public accommodations law did not
encompass "news" then newspapers would have no legal
obligation to treat heterosexual and gay social announcements
equally. However, the court found another ground to deny the
plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction against the
50 STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 68-69.
51 Id. at 119. See also infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing
Stonewall).
52 See STREITMATTER, supra note 21, at 289.
See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 270-72. In general, obituaries both neglected
to list AIDS as a cause of death and refused "to acknowledge a surviving gay spouse."
Id. at 271. That policy began to change in 1987, when the New York Times introduced
into its obituary narratives the term "long-time companion."
Linebarier v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., No. 96-875554 (Or. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5,
1996).
55 See PCC § 23.01.070, cited in Linebarier v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., No. 96-
875554, slip op. at 2 (Or. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996). I thank the plaintiffs' attorney in this
case, Renee E. Jacobs, for copies of her Memorandum and the court's opinion.
Linebarier, No. 96-875554, slip op. at 2.
57 Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
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paper.59 Because both sides' definition of "wedding" was
reasonable, and therefore either choice was rational, the court
ultimately refused to order the paper to publish the
announcement.' ° The Oregonian eventually agreed to publish
same-sex wedding announcements for a fee.6
The court's opinion is notable for its spartan discussion
of the critical issues. Nowhere does it directly address (1) the
relationship of the city ordinance prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations to the paper's asserted First
Amendment claims or (2) why wedding announcements qualify
as "news" and therefore merit the highest level of First
Amendment protection available. These questions will be
considered in further detail in subsequent sections of this
Article.62
Until recently, the New York Times similarly refused to
publish announcements of civil unions solemnized in
Vermont. 3 Yet, many other papers had already decided that
publishing announcements of same-sex unions was fully in
keeping with their community obligations,' and offered this
access without activist intervention. The Brattleboro Reformer,
a paper serving the community that would later perform the
first of Vermont's civil union ceremonies, began publishing
same-sex announcements over ten years ago."5 Even the
" Id. at 4.
60 Id.
1 See Letter from Renbe E. Jacobs to the Editor of the Advocate, in ADVOC.,
Oct. 29, 1996, at 8. The Oregonian has since joined the trend initiated by the New York
Times, and agreed to accept same-sex union announcements. Oregon Same-Sex Unions
to Appear in Paper, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2002, at 18A.
62 See infra Parts III and IV.
See Frank DiGiacomo, New York Times Nixes Gay Couple's Wedding
Announcement, N.Y. OBSERVER, July 30, 2001, at 3; Inga Sorensen, Activists Lobby NY
Times to Get with the Times, N.Y. BLADE NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001, at
http://www.nyblade.com/local/OlO81Oa.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). The Times
decision provoked activists from the National Organization for Women to mount a
protest campaign. See Kimberlee Ward, Valentine's Day of Action Draws Much
Attention, NAT'L NOW TIMES, March 1997, available at http://www.now.orgnnt/03-
97/samesex.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). The campaign also targeted the
Washington Post. Id. The policy of the Washington Post today is to "run only paid
wedding and union announcements, on separate days." Christine Chinlund,
Announcing Gay Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2002, at All.
See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 303. Alwood, writing in 1996, pointed to
newspapers in Brattleboro, Vermont and Salina, Kansas, as well as nine others in New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Washington and California, as examples of newspapers
offering access without activist intervention.
Jennifer Harper, N.Y. Times Eyed for Bias, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at
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Fayetteville Observer in North Carolina,66 a newspaper serving
"a 10-county Bible Belt area that includes the U.S. Army's Fort
Bragg," publishes same-sex union announcements.67
Most of the newspapers publishing union
announcements seem to be, like the Fayetteville Observer,
smaller organizations more responsive to the wishes of their
community. For example, Edward Alwood explicitly describes
as "small- to medium-sized" the eleven newspapers he
identified as among the first to publish same-sex union
announcements.8 Moreover, organizations in that size range
dominate the GLAAD list of 180 newspapers known to offer
this service as of December 2002.69 This pattern may exist
because smaller newspapers are more directly involved in their
communities and thus are more responsive to the needs of their
readers."
While the list of newspapers recognizing the social
realities of the modern world continues to grow, thus far the
decision to publish same-sex union announcements is the
newspaper's own. The practice is not yet widespread, although
it is becoming more common, and certainly not all newspapers
equate responsible or equitable access with publication of
same-sex announcements. Each decision is approached de novo.
To ensure fair access to society pages for same-sex couples, and
to ease the economic risks to newspapers by diminishing the
novelty of publishing union announcements, courts must arm
themselves with clear, uniform analytical models.
2. The Earlier "Not Legal" Excuse
At one time, newspapers reasonably rebuffed requests
to publish same-sex union announcements by invoking the
purported requirement that published announcements be
Charles Broadwell, Commentary: "Civil Union" Announcement is a First,
FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, July 21, 2002.
67 Patricia Callahan, How a Gay Union Led to Paper's Soul-Search, WALL ST.
J., July 26, 2002, at B1. According to the editor of the Fayetteville Observer, "most of
the local reaction has been negative [although] much of the national response applauds
the paper's decision." Margaret Lillard, Reaction Varies to Gay-Union Item, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 28, 2002, at A22.
ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 303.
69 See GLAAD, supra note 4.
70 See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 257 ("A good newspaper must be a
community newspaper.") (quoting editor and publisher William R. Hearst III); cf
Lillard, supra note 67.
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legally binding." This argument, even if principled at one time,
nevertheless placed some papers in an odd position. For
example, the St. Petersburg Times received wide notice for its
decision to extend domestic partner benefits to its gay
employees.72 Yet, at the same time the paper declined to publish
same-sex union announcements because "marriage [is bly
definition ... a legal as well as personal relationship, and one
licensed by the state."73 Because Florida does not sanction
same-sex marriage, these unions were not suited for its
announcement pages. Interestingly, the paper presented the
decision as out of its control, claiming that it was powerless to
treat same-sex announcements any other way until state law
changed: "If that state policy [the decision not to license same-
sex marriages] changes, our pages will reflect that change.
Meanwhile, our employment policies fall entirely within our
company's control, and so we extended these benefits as a
matter of basic fairness."" As others have noted, however,
"legal marriage is the threshold only if a newspaper chooses to
make it so.""
The "not legal" argument's flaws are twofold. First, the
papers already publish relationship announcements that lack
legal significance in most jurisdictions: Engagements. Although
common law originally allowed a person to be sued for breach
of promise to marry, since the 1930s at least twenty-five states
have enacted "heartbalm" statutes abolishing this cause of
action.76 In these jurisdictions, at least, the status of being
" See, e.g., Deb Taylor, Journal, Mercury Editors Speak to FHA, FLINT HILLS
OBSERVER, Dec. 1998, available at http://www.debtaylor.com/fho/129802.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2002) ("the [Manhattan] Mercury will not print same-sex wedding
announcements because same-sex marriages are not legal"); Dan Kennedy, Official
Notice: Gay Unions and the Wedding Pages, BOSTON PHOENIX, May 31, 2001, available
at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/this..just-in/documents/01655-
650.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
72 See, e.g., The Advocate Report, ADVOC., June 24, 1997, at 23.
73 Personal communication from Paul C. Tash, Executive Editor, St.
Petersburg Times on June 24, 1997.
74 Id.
75 Inga Sorensen, Activists Lobby NY Times to Get with the Times, N.Y.
BLADE NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001, available at http://www.nyblade.com/local/010810a.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002). Newspapers invoke the "not legal" argument with sufficient
frequency that plaintiffs are wise preemptively to rebut the claim. See, e.g.,
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8-9,
Linebarier v. Oregonian Publishing Co., (No. 96C 875554) (Or. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996).
76 Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There's No "I Do". A Model for
Awarding Damages under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1995).
Florida, the state of the St. Petersburg Times, is one of these states with a "heartbalm"
statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 771.01-07 (West 1986).
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engaged entails no legal consequences and can be broken
without special liability. Consistency would require that any
paper invoking the "not legal" argument to bar same-sex
announcements must also refuse to publish engagement
announcements, limiting their pages only to formal, legally
binding marriages.
Louisiana, home state of the Times-Picayune, has
retained the cause of action for breach of promise to marry."
This cause of action belies Louisiana's tradition as a
jurisdiction of civil law, since no civil law country, including
France, allows recovery for breach of a promise to marry."
Rather, Louisiana adopted this cause of action from the
common law tradition of its sister states. This fact results in
the ironic situation that Louisiana is preserving a common law
practice after the majority of genuinely common law
jurisdictions have abandoned it.
Because Louisiana recognizes engagements as having
legal significance, the Times-Picayune is one of the few
newspapers that could assert the "not legal" argument without
being immediately inconsistent. Oddly, this is the one
argument that the paper did not assert to justify its policy
against the NOHRC charge.79 Even had the paper offered this
reason, however, it should have failed because of the second
flaw inherent in the "not legal" rationale: same-sex unions are
not always without legal significance.
Same-sex marriage equivalents exist in some foreign
jurisdictions, including the Netherlands."° The fact that the
union may have no legal significance in the locality of the paper
should not be the determining factor. If the union is a binding
arrangement in the place of celebration and in the domicile
immediately after the marriage, the union is legally significant
and should not be so easily dismissed by a newspaper.
Moreover, the varieties of "legal" same-sex relationships
are not exhausted by marriage equivalents. Gay relationships
17 Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) ("Louisiana does
recognize a cause of action for damages when a party breaches a promise to marry.").
78 Sanders v. Gore, 676 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (citing M.
PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CML § 781 (1959)).
" See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction Ex. B, Affidavit of James Amoss, Times Picayune Publ'g
Corp. v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A95-518N, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4842 (La. App.
4th Cir. April 13, 1995).
See Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A
Netherlands-United States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141 (2001).
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can have less legal significance than heterosexual marriages,
but still retain some modicum of legal significance. These
legally significant relationships can range from the full civil
unions of Vermont, to the much less weighty, but still legally
cognizable, domestic partnerships registered in various towns
and cities."s  Several newspapers recognized this when
formulating their internal guidelines governing publication of
same-sex announcements. The New York Times, for example,
requires that couples "[clelebrate their commitment in a public
ceremony" or "[e]nter into a legally recognized civil union
(currently available only in Vermont) or register their domestic
partnership (in those localities, including New York City, that
offer registration)."82 The Fayetteville Observer "will run [union
announcements] only if they involve local couples who are
united in a state-sanctioned ceremony,"83 without requiring
that the ceremony be a "marriage."
The function of the "not legal" argument will probably
change as more papers accept same-sex society
announcements. Its utility no longer will be to keep
announcements out of the paper, but to segregate them into a
special section. For example, although the Boston Globe
recently decided to run announcements, the paper will not
intermingle them with those from heterosexuals. 4  The
justification for this differential treatment, according to a Globe
editor, is that it "recognizes a distinction as defined by law and
as defined by most religions as well."85 Other papers, such as
the Charlotte Observer, adopted a similar position for similar
reasons. An interesting question for the future will be
" A listing of states, cities and counties offering some form of domestic
partnership benefits and registration can be found in WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE,
LEGISLATING EQUALITY 85-86 (NGLTF Policy Institute 2000), available at
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
"' Times Will Begin Reporting Gay Couples' Ceremonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2002, at A30.
Broadwell, supra note 66.
Mark Jurkowitz, Globe to Publish Same-Sex Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
29, 2002, at B3. The first announcements in the Globe ran on October 13, and featured
three male couples on its "Special Occasions" page. Globe Publishes First Gay
Announcements, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 14, 2002, at 16A.
Jurkowitz, supra note 84, at B3.
See Debby Morse, Coming Out In Print, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 2, 2002,
available at http://www.examiner.com/noremorse/default.jsp?story=n.morse. 1002w
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
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whether segregation of union announcements will itself not fall
under the rule of Pittsburgh Press, discussed below.87
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE: THE INTANGIBLES OF MARRIAGE
Why would the plaintiffs against the Times-Picayune be
willing to assume the risks, burdens and expenses of filing a
complaint, merely to get their picture in the paper? What could
be motivating them? A newspaper's refusal to publish same-sex
union announcements may seem to verge on the trivial.8
Arguably, society has more important concerns generally and
the gays' rights89 movement specifically, such as attaining the
right for gay men and lesbians to marry. ° Under this view,
newspaper treatment of same-sex relationships is an important
but secondary issue, and certainly not the proper target for the
full force of constitutional argument.
That view of the matter, however, obscures what is truly
being contested in the battle over same-sex marriage: the
public recognition of gay relationships. The arguments in this
Part demonstrate why public recognition is important;
subsequent Parts present arguments demonstrating why
recognition of same-sex relationships should prevail. To clarify
the ultimate prize at stake, my argument begins with a brief
87 See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
See Holly J. Morris & Vicky Hallett, Public Displays of Affection, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 2002, at 42 (quoting gay activists that the publication of
same-sex union announcements is "the lighter, fluffier side of gay issues"). See also
Michael Bronski, Standard Deviation: Do 'Community Standards' Bar the Publishing
of Gay-Wedding Announcements? Or Are Major Newspapers Simply Rubber-Stamping
the Comfortable Status Quo?, BOSTON PHOENIX, Aug. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-features/other-stories/multipage/document
s/02388117.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) ("On some level, the refusal to print these
notices seems petty, even as the fight to get them printed comes across as frivolous.").
"9 Although "gay rights" is the more common term, it is inaccurate and
misleading. It connotes a species of rights, "gay rights," which are different from other
kinds of rights. This language plays into the hands of opponents who argue that "gay
rights are special rights," and thus undemocratic. The term that more accurately
denotes our goal is "gays' rights." "Gays' rights" refers to the rights that gay people
possess, which are-or should be-the same rights that nongay people possess.
90 According to recent polls, attaining the right to marry has become the top
priority of the gays' rights movement. See Deb Price, Marriage Law Becomes Gay
Priority, DETROIT NEWS, May 20, 2002, at A9 (discussing poll finding that 83% of
survey respondents said marriage should be one of the movement's top three priorities;
47% said it should be number one goal). See also Thomas M. Keane, Jr., Why Gays Seek
to Bar the Door to Rogers, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 25, 2002, at 29 ("[G]ay marriage [has
become] the SINE QUA NON of the gay civil rights movement.").
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review of the litigation seeking to procure the right for gay men
and lesbians to marry.91
A. Brief History of the Movement for Gays' Rights and
Same-Sex Marriage
The initiation of the modem gays' rights movement
conventionally is ascribed to the Stonewall riots of June 1969.
Despite only a few years earlier having won the right to be
served alcohol in public establishments,92 homosexuals in bars
remained vulnerable to recurring police harassment on morals
charges. After midnight on the night of June 27, 1969, police
attempted a raid on a popular gay bar, the Stonewall Inn, on
Christopher Street in New York City.93 Police had raided gay
bars many times before; in fact, this was the second raid of
Stonewall that week.94 For reasons we may never know-
although it may be no coincidence that this was the night of
Judy Garland's funeral95-this time the patrons fought back.
Barricaded in the bar, the police defended themselves from the
"drag queens [and] butch dykes"96 with spray from a fire hose.97
The Tactical Patrol Force arrived to confront the crowd of over
one thousand chanting gays, who stood their ground against
the heavily armed officers.9" When it was over, the police had
injured "an untold number" and arrested thirteen.99 Thousands
of gays staged protests on each of the next several nights,
giving voice to their newfound determination to finally claim
91 For a review of the same-sex marriage legal highlights, see generally
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter EQUALITY PRACTICE].
92 See, e.g., One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc., v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 235 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1967) (holding that the mere congregation of apparent
homosexuals in bars does not justify revoking liquor license); see also DUDLEY
CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 21 (1999).
93 See TOBY MAROTrA, THE POLITICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 71 (1981).
ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 82.
9' See LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM: THE ADVOCATE HISTORY OF THE GAY AND
LESBIAN MOVEMENT 19 (Mark Thompson ed., 1994). For a subculture whose members
have been euphemistically called the "friends of Dorothy," the significance of Garland's
death is obvious.
9Id.
97 MAROTrA, supra note 93, at 72.
98 ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 83.
9Id.
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their place in society, thus turning the Stonewall riots into the
"Hairpin Drop Heard around the World."00
Almost immediately, same-sex marriage became an
issue in the new gay liberation movement. In 1971, Baker v.
Nelson'01 became the first appellate decision to hold that a
same-sex couple does not have the right to marry."' Similar
cases soon followed, all upholding state rules prohibiting same-
sex marriage. 10 3  Despite these early cases testing the
boundaries of tolerance and same-sex marriage, the gays'
rights movement kept marriage far from the front-burner. In
those early days, the more urgent need was for gays to stay
alive and out of jails and mental hospitals. Specifically, the
activists sought to remove from homosexuals the threat of
blackmail, to overturn the laws criminalizing sodomy 4 and to
excise homosexuality from the psychiatric manual of mental
illnesses."5
Although always in the background, same-sex marriage
did not become the showcase issue of the gays' rights
movement until the 1993 case of Baehr v. Lewin.06 In Baehr,
three couples challenged Hawaii's refusal to provide marriage
licenses to same-sex couples under Hawaii Revised Statutes
section 572-1, which restricts marital relations to a male and a
female. 07 The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that because
Hawaii's Constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of sex
(an argument none of the parties had asserted or briefed),
Hawaii could justify section 572-1 only by surviving a strict
too MAROTTA, supra note 93, at 77. The selection of June as "Gay Pride Month"
commemorates the Stonewall riots, acknowledging their singular significance in the
initiation of the modern era of gays' rights.
101 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
102 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 48 (1996) [hereinafter CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE].
103 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding
lower court ruling that, as a matter of definition, Kentucky's denial of marriage to
same-sex couple did not violate the federal Constitution); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting the argument that the refusal to marry same-sex couples
violated state equal rights amendment).
104 According to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, as of July 2002,
fifteen states still retain sodomy laws criminalizing homosexual activity. NGLTF,
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force: The Right to Privacy in the U.S., at
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomymap.gif (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
'o' See generally RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (1981).
106 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
10' Id. at 60.
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scrutiny analysis. 8 To maintain its refusal to grant marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, the state had to show a
compelling interest in barring same-sex marriage and that this
refusal was the narrowest possible means to achieve that
end."° The court remanded the case, and Judge Kevin Chang
ruled decisively in favor of the plaintiffs.10  A state
constitutional amendment passed by referendum, however,
rendered the case moot."'
Many of the movement's political spokespersons
regretted that such a volatile, losing issue had emerged to
detract from what they considered the more achievable goals of
employment nondiscrimination and inclusion in hate crimes
laws. "2 Critics of the effort to promote same-sex marriage fell
silent, however, as the cases first in Hawaii' and then in other
states"4 raised same-sex marriage to the forefront of the
consciousness of both the general public and the gay and
lesbian community.
This public discussion has provoked three distinct
responses from the gay and lesbian community and its
supporters. " ' First, there are those who oppose same-sex
" Id. at 67.
109 Id.
110 Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Cir. Ct. Haw., Dec. 3, 1996).
ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 91, at 39-42. The amendment to
the Hawaii Constitution, which passed with a 69% majority, added the sentence, "The
legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." Id. at 40.
12 See id. at 87 ("Marriage was not the goal of the gayocracy before the
1990s."). See also Andrew Sullivan, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 13, 18 (1996) ("I beg to differ with the Human Rights Campaign. No, the
country doesn't have better things to do than this."). Sullivan elsewhere describes this
situation: "In terms of Hawaii, it was the court that ruled. In fact, if the gay
establishment had their way, it would never have happened. In fact, no gay group
would support that legal suit. It had to be a straight guy from the ACLU." Carol Lloyd,
Marriage as a Revolutionary Act, SALON, Nov. 30, 1998, available at
http://archive.salon.com/books/int/1998/llcov_30int.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2002).
113 Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
114 See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Stat., No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL
88743, at *1-6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1998). The next battlegrounds appear to be New Jersey and Indiana. See Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, Lewis v. Harris, No. L-00-4233-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Oct.
8, 2002) (filing subsequent to original complaint filed June 26, 2002, by Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc.) available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-
data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/135.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); see also Andrew Jacobs,
New Jersey is Likely to be Gay Marriage Battleground, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at
B5; Matthew Tully, Same-sex Marriage Heading to Court, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 22,
2002, at 1A.
115 The gay community's opponents resist same-sex marriage because they
believe it to be morally wrong and oppose validating it in any way, including publishing
announcements. For a taste of the vehemence with which some quarters oppose gays
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marriage. Some adopt this negative stance because they believe
same-sex marriage undermines traditional marriage."' Others
oppose same-sex marriage because they believe marriage is an
intrinsically oppressive institution that no one, gay or straight,
should support.117 A second response applauds the Vermont
and their relationships, see Ex parte H.H., No. 1002045, 2002 WL 227956, at *4 (Ala.
Feb. 15, 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring) ("[A] sexual relationship between two persons
of the same gender [sic] creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is
sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or her own children.").
"a See, e.g., Dale M. Schowengerdt, Note, Defending Marriage: A Litigation
Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex "Marriage," 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 487, 488 (2002) ("[Tlhis
Note uses the term 'marriage advocates' to describe those who believe in the Judeo-
Christian ethic of one man and one woman becoming one flesh. Anyone who truly views
marriage this way will naturally be opposed to same-sex marriage ... ."); George W.
Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 582 (1999)
("[Slociety has strong reasons to favor traditional marriage and to deny such treatment
to the unmarried and to homosexual, endogamous and bestial relationships."); Lynn D.
Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from
Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 735, 768 (1998) ("The claims for
same-sex marriage provide a marvelous opportunity... to help a new generation to see
and comprehend as never before the great value of covenant heterosexual marriage.").
Predictably, persons with this view regard the decision by the New York
Times as an unqualified error in judgment. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 65 (noting the
disagreement of the Family Research Council with the Times's decision because it
serves "a radical social political agenda"). See also O'Reilly Factor (Fox News television
broadcast, Aug. 20, 2002) (statements of Genevieve Wood of the Family Research
Council). Among her comments Wood drags out the canard that "if we're going to have
homosexual marriages on the New York Times [wedding] pages, why not have
polygamists on there as well?" Id. For a clarification of the reasons why polygamy
cannot rationally be collapsed into same-sex marriage for policy purposes, and why
resort to this "slippery slope" argument entails an implicit acknowledgment by
conservatives that same-sex marriage cannot be argued to be an intrinsic evil, see
James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is Not a
Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521 (2002).
"' Examples of gay men and lesbians speaking out against battling for the
right to marry include Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation,
in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20
(Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL vii
(1999) ("marriage is unethical"); Steven K Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994); Laurie Essig, Same-Sex Marriage: I Don't Care If It is Legal, I
Still Think It's Wrong-And I'm a Lesbian, SALON, July 10, 2000, available at
http://archive.salon.com/mwtfeature/2000/07/10/marriage (last visited Dec. 3, 2002);
Katha Pollitt, Polymaritally Perverse, NATION, Oct. 4, 1999, at 10 ("Shouldn't the real
libertarian position be that marriage itself has to go?"); and JACK NICHOLS, THE GAY
AGENDA: TALKING BACK TO THE FUNDAMENTALISTS 106 (1996) ("In bonding, people can
best assist each other by remaining financially and emotionally self-contained. I look
forward to a society structured primarily for individuals rather than for coupled or
nuclear-unit survival.").
Nietzsche, the German philosopher, also concluded that marriage should
be abolished. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 544 (Walter
Kaufmann ed., 1982). See also Elaine Herscher, Most Gays Embrace Right to Marry,
But Others Ask, "Why?", S. F. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2000, at A13 ("For other [gays],
marriage is a chimera that threatens to enslave gays and bleach the color from their
culture."); Across the USA, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2000, at 10A ("A proposed same-sex
marriage ban on California's March 7 ballot is drawing some unexpected support from
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solution of civil unions."8 Civil unions are state-authorized
relationships that have many of the economic and legal
benefits associated with traditional marriage, but which are
denied the use of the term "marriage" and its associated
symbolism."' The third response refuses to accept anything less
than a full marriage equivalent for same-sex couples, including
use of the word "marriage. 20
Which of these three positions one adopts is a function
of how one weights the tangibles and intangibles of marriage.
By tangibles I refer to the objective consequences of the
married status, such as tax exemptions and rights to inherit.
The General Accounting Office identified 1,049 federal laws in
which marital status is a factor.' 2' State laws add a similar
number of tangible benefits to marriage, as evidenced by the
long list of Vermont statutes' 22 implicated in the court order
that same-sex partners "may not be deprived of the statutory
benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex
who choose to marry.' 23  Although tangibles are usually
positive, they can also be negative, in the form of imposed
a small group of gay men and women."); Margaret Buist, Days Numbered for
Institution of Marriage, LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 17, 2001, at A13 ("Instead of
fighting to join in marriage, the gay and lesbian community should be fighting to
dismantle it."). This anti-marriage attitude among some gays extends to a distaste for
wedding announcements generally. See Timothy Noah, Gay or Straight, Times
Wedding Pages are a Sham, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/opinion/3913829.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2003) ("If [Times editor Howell] Raines is really interested in advancing equality, he
shouldn't reform the Times wedding pages. He should abolish them.").
'18 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (Supp. 2001). Between July 1, 2000-
the first day the civil union option became available-and January 4, 2002, Vermont
legalized approximately 3,471 unions. See Laurel J. Sweet, Commitment Phobia: A Guy
Thing? Study: Most Gay Civil Unions are Women's, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 8, 2002, at 5.
Two-thirds of these unions were for female couples. Id. In that time, only four
dissolutions were reported in Vermont, three of which were female couples. Id.
119 See ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 91, at 43-82.
120 See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 11, Lewis v. Harris, No. L-00-4233-
02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Oct. 8, 2002) (filing subsequent to original complaint filed
June 26, 2002, by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.) available at
httpJ/www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/135.pdf (last visited Jan.
10, 2003) ('Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court... enjoin Defendants ... to
treat Plaintiff couples no differently than other couples regarding access to marriage.").
See also Justice Johnson's opinion in Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1998). The
present author can be placed in this category.
' General Accounting Office, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 2 (GAO/OGC-97-16,
1997).
' See Vermont Legislative Council, Working Draft of Statutes Potentially
Affecting the Rights and Responsibilities of Married Persons (2000), at
http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-vt.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
in Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
2003]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
duties. For example, one spouse may be financially responsible
for the debts incurred by the other.
By intangibles, on the other hand, I refer to the
subjective benefits of marriage, including the social regard
lavished on the married, the community support available to
couples to help them manage the dynamics of the relationship,
and the public expectation that henceforth the two people
bound in marriage are presumptively an indivisible unit. The
Supreme Court has itself recognized the great importance of
intangible benefits: "[M]arriages . . . are expressions of
emotional support and public commitment. These elements are
an important and significant aspect of the marital
relationship."124 Intangibles may also be negative, such as the
expectation to conform to behavior considered appropriate for
couples (e.g., monogamy).
Those for whom the tangible and intangible negatives
predominate will view marriage as a regressive and
constraining patriarchal institution that has outlived its social
usefulness.'25 Why would anyone want to participate in a rotten
institution, especially gay men and lesbians whose very
existence is presumably sexually and culturally transgressive?
In contrast, when the positive tangibles such as inheritance
rights, visitation and custody rights and spousal benefits
predominate, civil unions are an acceptable compromise.
In Hawaii" 6 and Vermont, society has shown itself to be
more willing to allow access to these tangibles, so long as it can
continue to deny gay couples the intangibles.'27 Such solutions
124 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
125 For an overview of the traditional patriarchal underpinnings of marriage,
see generally E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? (1999). That gloss on marriage that
feminists rightly find objectionable is preserved in the formal law of Louisiana. That
state's earlier "Head and Master" system, under which, for example, only the husband
had full power to alienate all property, no longer holds. Still present in the Civil Code,
however, is a provision that expressly requires wives to yield to their husbands. See LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 216 (West 1993) ("In case of difference between the parents [in
matters of the child], the authority of the father prevails."). The common law had a
similar rule. Blackstone observed that "the father had a natural right to his children,
while a mother 'was entitled to no power but only to reverence and respect.'" GRAFF,
supra at 107.
126 Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383, granted
some sixty socioeconomic benefits to couples who cannot legally marry (i.e., excluding
heterosexual couples who simply choose not to marry), and was considered a
compromise measure to the referendum that constitutionally excluded homosexuals
from marriage.
127 "Hawaii has decided to afford many of the financial benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples in the hope that the emotional, religious, and symbolic aspects of
marriage do not also need to be extended." MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-
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are an acceptable compromise to those who minimize the
importance of the intangibles. The fact that heterosexual
society willingly shares the one but not the other suggests that
the truly valuable consequences of marriage for heterosexual
society are not the tangibles, but the intangibles."' As one
observer noted, "[tihe fight over gay marriage has become a
fight over ownership of a word. But what a potent little word it
is.
" 129
Although some of the tangible economic and legal
benefits of marriage may be more important to members of the
couple as individuals (e.g., the availability of insurance
benefits), the intangible benefit of public recognition is
arguably the most important benefit of marriage to the couple
as a unit. For this reason, civil unions cannot be, as some have
argued, a transitional phase on the way to same-sex
marriage."O Anyone for whom marriage is the goal will not be
SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 65 (1999).
128 Note the conflation of desires for the tangibles and intangibles of marriage
in the stories of the twenty-one known surviving gay partners of victims of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. See Inga Sorensen, New York Law Backs Sept. 11
Domestic Partners, WASH. BLADE, May 31, 2002, available at
http://www.washblade.com/national/020531e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). The
withholding of the tangible benefits hurt them most because it indicated a denial of the
intangibles. See, e.g., Kathleen Burge, Sept. 11 Leaves Same-Sex Partners Adrift, Laws
Bar Benefits, Even Recognition, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2002, at B1 ("'That's what's so
painful to me,' [said Nancy Walsh, whose partner of twelve years died on one of the
planes, but who was ignored by American Airlines]. I constantly feel like I'm looking
for someone to validate and approve what I know I had. It's just not right."). American
Airlines also refused to recognize the relationship between Jeff Collman and Keith
Bradkowski. Bradkowski is prepared to fight for his share of the federal victim
compensation fund, "but his main motivation is not the money." Ray Delgado, Grieving
Man Stakes His Claim to Equality, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2002, at A3.
These stories reveal that tangibles are frequently not ends in themselves
but instead are means to the end of the intangible of public recognition.
129 Margaret Wente, From the Closet to the Altar, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
July 20, 2002, at A15. As only one example of the power of the words associated with
marriage, a Georgia state representative was pressured to stop referring to her lesbian
partner as a "spouse" in the legislative directory. See Rhonda Cook, Gay Lawmaker
Will Stop Calling Partner "Spouse," ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 9, 2001, at D1. Related
controversies have arisen when anti-gay parties believe that the public presentation of
same-sex partners is not suitably demur. In Ohio, lower courts refused a name-change
petition from two lesbians "because to do so would be to give an aura of propriety and
official sanction to their cohabitation." In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ohio 2002).
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this result, holding that the court's function in
name-changes is merely to ascertain that the change is not made for fraudulent
purposes. Id. at 848. "Any discussion, then, on the sanctity of marriage, the well-being
of society, or the state's endorsement of nonmarital cohabitation is wholly
inappropriate and without any basis in law or fact." Id. at 849. A similar battle was
fought, and won, in New Jersey. See In re Application for a Change of Name by
Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
130 For opinions to the contrary, see Deb Price, Civil Unions a Step to Marital
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satisfied, even temporarily, with civil unions, because civil
unions provide substantially fewer of the intangible benefits
that make marriage a desirable and valued social institution.
Civil unions are the mere husks of the institution, from which
the heart has been wrest.
B. The Value of Public Acknowledgement and Social
Support
What, then, are these intangible benefits of marriage?
An example from a Canadian same-sex marriage battle
illustrates. Joe Varnell and Kevin Bourassa commemorated
their relationship in private and informal ceremonies, but they
still felt a void that could be filled only by a traditional
religious marriage ceremony that would be recognized by their
government.13 ' In Canada, as in the United States, a couple can
become legally married by receiving a license from the
government. But Ontario law also allows the government to
issue a valid license to any couple who has had their intention
to marry published by their church for three consecutive
Sundays. These publications of intent are known as banns.'32
Marriage banns, once accomplished, result in a license that is
presented to the civil officers only for registration; significantly,
registration is not needed to render a marriage legal.'33 In
Rights, DETROIT NEWS, July 15, 2002, at A7 ("Civil unions are a critical first step in
achieving equality for gay couples."). The sense that civil unions and same-sex
marriage are not aligned on an incremental continuum, but instead occupy the same
space in civil liberties-making civil unions always a poor choice, since they preempt
the possibility of marriage-is captured by the concern expressed by an advisor to the
governor of New Jersey, in reaction to the filing of Lewis v. Harris: "There is concern
that the lawsuit may stall domestic partnership legislation [and] may provoke a
reaction .... I would have preferred that they didn't file the lawsuit at this time."
Michael Booth, Gay Marriage Suit May Derail Push for 'Civil Union' Status, N.J. L.J.,
July 1, 2002, at 1. For a complete argument for the position that incrementalism is the
appropriate approach to marriage and all gays' rights issues, see generally ESKRIDGE,
EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 91. For the contrary opinion that incrementalist
approaches are presumptively irrational as a deliberate strategy, however accurately
they describe retrospectively how things happened, see James M. Donovan, Baby Steps
or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental Extension of Rights is Not a Defensible Strategy,
38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2001).
131 See generally KEVIN BOURASSA & JOE VARNELL, JUST MARRIED: GAY
MARRIAGE AND THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).
"' See id. at 4. See also R.S.O. 1990 c. M.3, s. 4 ("No marriage may be
solemnized except under the authority of a license issued in accordance with this Act or
the publication of banns."). R.S.O. 1990 c. M.3, s. 17 sets forth the requisites for the
publication of banns.
"' R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, s. 28 sets forth procedures for entry into the marriage
register after ceremony.
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January 2001, Varnell and Bourassa had their banns
published, followed by a formal wedding ceremony. Their fight
for recognition of the legal validity of this ceremony then began
a long trek through the Canadian courts.'
Relevant to our present concerns is the description of
their treatment after the wedding. "After they had their
wedding, their family treated them differently.... They really
viewed Kevin and Joe as a real couple after they got
married."135 They had shared many years together, and already
celebrated a purely religious union ceremony, but only after
they participated in a ceremony of potential legal significance
did their family begin to take them seriously as a couple. This
"difference" constitutes the primary intangible benefit of
marriage. Before the legal wedding,
[q]uite a few . . . still introduced us as each other's "friend." They
believed they were being tactful. Still others placed our portrait in a
"special" place, away from the photos of other family members and
their spouses, who were all grouped together on the wall. Our place
was in the shadows, in words left unsaid, marginalized with the
encouragement of church and state. 136
'34 According to the plaintiffs, the refusal of the government to register the
licensed marriage does not affect its legality, it being "open to the church and the
couples to simply ignore the registration requirement." See BOURASSA & VARNELL,
supra note 131, at 272-73.
On July 12, 2002, a three-judge panel unanimously declared that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is discriminatory and unconstitutional (in
Canada). Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 C.R.D.J. Lexis 122. The effect of
this decision has been suspended for up to twenty-four months to allow a legislative
response. According to the decision, a failure to respond appropriately to the concerns
of the court within this time period would result in a redefinition of the common law
understanding of marriage from "a man and a woman" to "two persons." The Canadian
government has announced that it will appeal the Ontario decision. See Stephanie
Rubec, Gays Left at the Altar: Ottawa Appeals Ruling Allowing Same-Sex Unions,
TORONTO SUN, July 30, 2002, at 4.
135 Christopher Hutsul, Marriage Limbo, TORONTO STAR, June 25, 2002, at El
(emphasis added). This observation accords with that from other couples. "We don't
have that demarcating event. We live together-like straight men and women live
together-but they are not 'family' because they haven't had that marriage in front of
everyone else. None of us have that -demarcation, and maybe that's what's keeping
others from looking at us as a family, because our culture has said that the family unit
begins when you get married." ELIZABETH A. SAY & MARK R. KoWALEWSIU, GAYS,
LESBIANS & FAMILY VALUES 85 (1998).
136 BOURASSA & VARNELL, supra note 131, at 14-15. Say and Kowalewski
addressed the issue of family introducing gay couples as each other's "friend": "Since
the broader society has no word for a committed relationship other than heterosexual
marriage, gay and lesbian relationships are often named as something less than what
they are. Calling a son's or daughter's life partner a 'friend' or a 'roommate' is to
diminish the significance of the relationship." SAY & KOWALEwSKI, supra note 135, at
66.
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The primary intangible benefit of civilly recognized
marriage (and, I would argue, the primary benefit of any kind
from marriage) is the social approval and support extended to
the married couple.'37 While many of the important tangible
benefits that accrue automatically upon marriage can be
mimicked by contract, nothing the couple can do will substitute
for this intangible benefit of a marriage. Marriage and its
corresponding public approval have a critical impact on the
quality of the relationship, one that arises solely through legal
recognition. Hence the irreducible need for access to legal
marriage by same-sex couples, a need that is not satisfied by
the creation of civil unions or domestic partnerships.
Innumerable little gestures demonstrate this social
support,' all of which instantiate the presumption that the
couple is a couple and that society presumes their couplehood
to be permanent.3 9 And, as in so many other things, thinking it
so can make it so.
[Slociety as a whole has certain generally shared expectations about
the kind of relationship that married couples typically have (while it
lacks any such clear expectations about relationships of other sorts).
Once a couple is legally married, society will come to expect that
their relationship is of this kind.
140
Critical, then, is this role of public expectation. "It is the public
recognition of the status of 'married' that constitutes the most
important benefit of marriage, and what is most crucially
... See Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union: Why "Civil Union"Isn't Marriage,
NEw REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 18 (stating marriage is not merely an accumulation of
benefits, but rather a fundamental mark of citizenship). See also David B. Cruz, "Just
Don't Call It Marriage". The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive
Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 934 (2001) ("[E]xpressions of weddedness are
importantly self-expressive and self-constitutive.").
'38 Contrarily, the lack of social awareness of the couple can result in cruel
and needlessly punishing injustices. As only one recent example, a California man was
prevented from being at the bedside of his partner while the partner died of AIDS.
Although the man had documents naming him as his partner's agent by power of
attorney, the Maryland hospital still refused admittance because he did not qualify as
"family." Tom Pelton, Man's Partner Angry at Hospital, BALT. SUN, Feb. 28, 2002, at
lB. As proof of the themes of this Article, published descriptions of the episode
minimized the relationship between the men, describing them as "housemates." Tom
Pelton, Surgeon Denies Bias in Visitation, BALT. SUN, Mar. 1, 2002, at lB.
"9 See also James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic
Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 649 (1998) [hereinafter An
Ethical Argument]. In addition, an underrated intangible of the expectation that the
couple will endure is receipt of public support and comfort should the relationship end.
See ALWOOD, supra note 9, at 289.
140 Ralph Wedgwood, What Are We Fighting For?, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN
REV. 32, 33 (1997).
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abridged when the State discriminates against gay couples who
want to marry.""" When society withholds public recognition,
that denial fundamentally weakens the relationship that
society ignores.12 Without legal marriage, "it is all too easy for
the rest of society to ignore same-sex relationships, and to
assume that they are only sexual, or involve no serious long-
term commitment or sharing of finances and household
responsibilities.""'
A relationship is never truly final and settled if it lacks
public acknowledgement; rather, it retains a tentative,
provisionary quality.'" Ordinarily during these provisionary
stages, the members of a couple decide whether they each want
to commit to the relationship. After that decision is made and
formalized by marriage, they put that question behind them
and commit their energies fully to the next phases of the
maturing relationship. Once breaking up has been "taken off
the table" as a possible response to a relationship difficulty, the
couple can direct more energy toward mending any subsequent
ruptures, energy that before would have been expended
calculating cost/benefit values of continuing the relationship at
all. Gay relationships, because they are denied marriage, are
never allowed to enter completely into this second, settled
phase. Therefore, they can tend to be less stable than married
heterosexual relationships. "5 Lurking in the background is
141 Id.
142 One study found that "satisfaction with social support," while highly
related to relationship satisfaction for both gay male and lesbian couples, was "more
strongly related to love for and liking of partner for lesbian couples than for gay
couples." Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship Quality of Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting
Couples, 15(3/4) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 93, 108-09 (1988). In other words, for lesbian
couples strong social support seems to intensify and strengthen the emotional bond
between the parties.
143 Wedgwood, supra note 140, at 33.
144 Empirical data support this claim. Lawrence Kurdek followed married
heterosexual couples, gay couples and lesbian couples for a period of five years. For
present purposes, the most pertinent results of this valuable study are that the
homosexual cohabitating couples were at least twice as likely to breakup during the
study period than were the married heterosexuals. Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship
Outcomes and Their Predictors: Longitudinal Evidence from Heterosexual Married, Gay
Cohabiting, and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 553, 565
(1998). Kurdek specifically links this greater tendency for gay relationships to dissolve
to the 'lack of formalized social and cultural supports for committed gay and lesbian
relationships . .. [and as a consequence the couples] encounter few institutionalized
barriers to leaving their relationships." Id.
145 For example, one study found that while heterosexual marriages are
stable, unmarried heterosexual "cohabitators" and gay and lesbian couples of less than
two years' duration tended to dissolve with similar frequency. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN &
PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 307 (1983). The
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always the tempting knowledge that the gay relationship can
dissolve at the first whim.' If gays currently avoid this fate, it
will be despite society, and not, as is the case for heterosexuals,
because of society.'47
Further enforcing the stability of heterosexual
marriage, heterosexual couples meet societal resistance when
they consider dissolving their legalized unions."'48 Friends and
implication is that unmarried couples, both straight and gay, however committed, are
vulnerable to a dissolution that does not threaten formally married couples.
Heterosexuals wishing to exit this danger phase can always marry; only gay couples
are permanently marooned.
An early statement of the effect of legal order on interpersonal relations
can be found in the work of John Stuart Mill. See generally John Stuart Mill, The
Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 117 (Stephen Collini ed.,
1989) (1869). There, Mill observed that laws requiring the submission of a woman to
her husband negatively affected the relationship between them. She could not be
expected to interact freely, or to express her opinions honestly, given the complete
power he exerted over her. The present claim that the legal prohibition on same-sex
marriage negatively affects the quality of the relationship of the gay couple can be
understood to be a species of Mill's argument.
146 See, e.g., Katherine Kersten, The Danger of Viewing Marriage as Just a
Lifestyle Choice, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., July 17, 2002, at A13 ("Cohabitation is
governed by an ethic of low commitment. As a result, cohabiting couples are less likely
than married couples to sacrifice for each other, or to develop vital skills of
communication and conflict resolution .... By definition, cohabitation is more about
'me' than 'we.' Each partner is free to leave the moment he or she no longer feels happy
or fulfilled."). This problem has been described as the alternatives of "fixing" and
"floating." SAY & KOWALEWSKI, supra note 135, at 27 (summarizing the work of
Zygmunt Bauman). In these terms, gays are at higher risk of becoming "floaters," that
is to say, people who "'cut[ ] one's losses,' giving up when the costs of... investment in
the relationship seem to have exceeded the return." Id.
147 See Letitia Anne Peplau, Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 177, 185 (John C.
Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) ("We should not minimize the psychological
stress that results from social rejection and stigma. What is noteworthy, however, is
the extent to which contemporary lesbians and gay men seem able to overcome these
obstacles and to create satisfying social networks. This is especially important because
of growing evidence that emotional support, guidance, assistance, and other forms of
social support contribute to mental and physical health.").
14" Duffy and Rusbult review the argued differences between gay and straight
couples:
Some authors have argued that a variety of societal factors might contribute
to lower satisfaction and commitment among lesbians and gay males than
among heterosexual women and men. First, the greater difficulty of
establishing and maintaining homosexual relationships in the face of
negative societal sanctions, with no societal approbation or legitimization,
may result in greater relationship cost and lower satisfaction. Second, it may
be less likely that homosexuals have the social support of friends, family, or
church for enduring relationships, a possibility that would imply lower levels
of commitment in homosexual relationships; in other words, important
external supports, a type of investment, may be lacking. Third, given that the
legal concept of communal property does not yet apply to homosexual
relationships, lesbians and gay men may be less likely to make some types of
investments in their relationship, e.g., buying a home, having children,
sharing material possessions .... This line of reasoning would lead us to
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the state alike expect them to be a couple, and they must work
long and hard to change these default expectations. The law
functions as an obstacle to dissolution as well, often requiring
some nontrivial time period to pass before the couple
permanently divorces, allowing a window of opportunity for
reconciliation."' Often those public messages of expected unity
do compel the heterosexual couple to renew their efforts to
resolve their difficulties. Gay couples, lacking that external
support of the relationship, may find it easier to simply
separate and begin anew with another candidate partner. 50 As
Margaret Mead once observed, "[tihere is no society in the
world where people have stayed married without enormous
community pressure to do so."'
The consequences of maintaining a successful marriage
ripple into all dimensions of life. Data show that married
persons enjoy a higher quality of life than do those who merely
cohabitate. 5 ' As compared to married couples,
expect lower satisfaction, smaller investment size, better alternatives, and
lower commitment in homosexual relationships.
Sally M. Duffy & Caryl E. Rusbult, Satisfaction and Commitment in Homosexual and
Heterosexual Relationships, 12(2) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 3 (1985/86). At the time these
authors wrote, they believed that "empirical evidence is lacking" to support these
assertions. Id. Later research, some of which is discussed in these notes, has
constructed an empirical basis for this general claim that by ignoring or actively
undermining the legitimacy of their relationships, society places gay and lesbian
couples at a disadvantage in their efforts to construct deep and enduring relationships.
149 In Louisiana, for example, divorce in most circumstances can only follow a
separation of 180 days. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 102 (West 1999). Petition for divorce is
extinguished if the parties reconcile during that time. LA. CIrV. CODE. ANN. art. 104
(West 1999).
150 In one study of gay couples, "[a]lmost all of the couples mentioned that the
same factors keep both gay and straight couples together or break them apart." Neil R.
Tuller, Couples: The Hidden Segment of the Gay World, 3(4) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 331,
341 (1978). See also BOURASSA & VARNELL, supra note 131, at 16 ("In the end, our own
strength as a couple would determine our ability to maintain our relationship, but we
had tasted, for the first time, the positive effect others can have on a relationship when
it is formalized within a community.").
HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOvE 109 (1992) (quoting Margaret Mead).
See Jonathan Rauch, The Marrying Kind: Why Social Conservatives
Should Support Same-Sex Marriage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2002, at 24
("Cohabitation tends to be both less stable and less happy than marriage, and this
appears to be true even after accounting for the possibility that the cohabiting type of
person may often be different from the marrying kind. Research suggests that
marriage itself brings something beneficial to the table."). Additional research has
shown that married men live longer. See Single Men 'Die Younger," BBC News Online,
Aug. 23, 2001, at http://www.newsbbc.co.ukll/hi/health/1506209.stm (last visited Oct.
31, 2002). Married men are also less likely to recommit crimes. Press Release, Cathy
Keen, University of Florida, UF Study: Marriage Can Reduce Life of Crime (Sept. 12,
2002), at http://www.napa.ufl.edu/2002news/recidivism.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
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cohabitating couples report lower levels of happiness, lower levels of
sexual exclusivity and poorer relationships with parents. Annual
rates of depression among cohabitators are more than three times
higher than among married couples. By almost every measure,
married couples are better off than cohabitators: On average, they
live longer, have better physical and mental health, and are more
productive in the labor force.15
3
This overview summarizes a report from the National Marriage
Project.' Although the report focuses on heterosexual
cohabitation, no logical impediment prevents the extension of
its conclusions to same-sex cohabiting couples. The report's
main conclusion is that cohabitators are disadvantaged relative
to married persons, that living together is not "just like
marriage" except for the lack of a piece of paper. 5' If we accept
these findings, then by refusing to allow gays to marry, society
condemns them to an inferior existence of unstable
relationships,"6 low interpersonal commitment and other
problems, including decreased mental health."7
Significantly, the report attributes the difference in
well-being between married and cohabiting couples in part to
"the better connection of married couples to the larger
153 Kersten, supra note 146.
1"4 DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE
TOGETHER? WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE
MARRIAGE (2002), at http://marriage.rutgers.edu (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
155 See id. at 14 ('It is only marriage that has the implicit long term contract,
the greater sharing of economic and social resources, and the better connection to the
larger community.").
156 See id. at 6-7 ("[C]ohabiting is inherently much less stable than marriage.
the break-up rate of cohabitors is far higher than for married partners. After 5 to 7
years, 39% of all cohabiting couples have broken their relationship ... and only 21%
are still cohabiting." [comparable figures for married couples are not provided]).
157 See id. at 6 ("[C]ohabiting relationships tend in many ways to be less
satisfactory than marriage relationships.").
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the claim here is not that gay couples
cannot forge relationships as healthy and enduring as heterosexual couples. See, e.g.,
12-Year Study of Gay & Lesbian Couples, Gottman Institute (2001), at
http://www.gottman.com/research/projects/gaylesbian (last visited Oct. 31, 2002)
("Overall, relationship satisfaction and quality are about the same across all couple
types (straight, gay, lesbian). . . .") The claim is only that it requires much more
personal effort on their part to achieve the same result that the straight couple can
expect to be provided by outside support. Energy not being an unlimited resource, the
increased demand to achieve results heterosexuals can expect with much less
investment means that fewer emotional and psychological resources are available to
gay couples, on the average, to pursue other goals. Just as "coming out" can be
liberating at the personal level, at the level of the interpersonal, the release from the
demand to constantly defend one's primary relationship can be equally liberating, and
the effects of this liberation are not merely metaphysical but practical as well.
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community. "158 To achieve the desirable outcomes, couples need
two interrelated elements: access to legal marriage, and public
support for those marriages. Gay couples currently lack both.
"The institution of marriage offers structural and cultural
support to heterosexual partners; the denial of marriage to gay
couples deprives them of this support.""5 9 Although a small
gesture, publishing same-sex announcements manifests public
support for whatever relationships the law currently allows gay
men and lesbians to cultivate.
For many of the benefits I label intangible-that is to
say, because marriage impacts so directly and fundamentally
on how one lives one's life-the Supreme Court has recognized
the right to marry as "one of the basic civil rights of man."6°
The Court, however, has directly addressed the fundamental
right to marry in only two cases.' In the first, Loving v.
Virginia, the Court struck down laws criminalizing interracial
marriages, noting that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."'62 A decade later,
the Court reviewed its prior holdings and reaffirmed that "the
right to marry is of fundamental importance"'63 and "is part of
the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."" Because marriage is a
fundamental right, "[wihen a statutory classification
significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests."6 '
Although some of the language discussing the right to
marry may suggest that marriage refers only to a heterosexual
8 POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, supra note 154, at 7.
159 M.D.A. Freeman, Not Such a Queer Idea: Is There a Case for Same Sex
Marriages?, 16 J. APPLIED PHIL. 1, 13 (1999).
160 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535;541 (1942).
161 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
162 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court struck down a
Wisconsin statute that forbade remarriage by persons without custody of children from
prior marriages, unless they could show that they were not delinquent in support
payments, and that the child was not currently or likely to become a ward of the state.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
163 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
164 Id. at 384.
165 Id. at 388.
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coupling,' that specification is not essential to either the idea
or the right of marriage.'67 Similarly narrow beliefs in an
earlier age presumed that marriage necessarily precluded
interracial marriage, a misunderstanding that the Court
dispelled in 1967.168 Racial similarity has been held to be a
contingent, not an essential requirement of marriage; so too,
eventually, will sex difference. Even the most elementary
analysis invites the conclusion that "it would strain credulity to
claim that lesbians and gays have the fundamental right to
marry, but they simply do not have the right to marry a same-
sex partner. " "'
Unlike racial similarity and sex differences, public
acknowledgment of the union is incontestably an essential, not
a contingent element of marriage. 70 An important expression of
that public acknowledgment is announcement of the union in
166 Several of the cases, for example, link the ideas of marriage and
procreation. The Court in Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, for example, noted that "[miarriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." But
note that even here marriage is severable from procreation: it is "marriage and
procreation," not "marriage for procreation." This same distinction is found in Turner v.
Safley, 482. U.S. 78 (1987). That case maintained the right of prisoners to marry, yet
acknowledged that they may be prevented from engaging in conjugal acts that might
lead to reproduction. In this, the Court acknowledges that marriage and procreation
are not synonymous rights, and that one might be protected but not the other. In other
words, even if intimately related, marriage and procreation are not coterminous, so
that one defines the other.
167 This issue is ably handled by the Alaska Superior Court's holding in
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998). The Brause court observed that the Hawaii court in Baehr v. Lewin
concluded that same-sex marriage was not "rooted in traditions and collective
conscience" such that its denial would threaten "the base of all our civil and political
institutions." Id. at *4 (quoting Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993)). Baehr
went on to find support for same-sex marriage on grounds other than the right to
marry, instead looking to the state constitution's equal protection clause.
The Brause court found that Baehr asked the wrong question. "The
relevant question is not whether same-sex marriage is so rooted in our traditions that
it is a fundamental right, but whether the freedom to choose one's own life partner is so
rooted in our traditions." Id. at *4. Which, of course, it is. By framing the question in
this way, the Alaska court could conclude that the right to marry a person of one's own
choosing is a fundamental right, and is not restricted to opposite-sex couples.
168 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's prohibition of
interracial marriage as a violation of both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
169 STRASSER, supra note 127, at 5-6. As Jonathan Rauch has pointed out, the
right to marry is meaningless if it does not include the right to marry someone you
love. Jonathan Rauch, Marrying Somebody, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 285,
286 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997).
"0 This fact is symbolically represented in the legal requirement that a
legitimate marriage ceremony have witnesses. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:244
(West 2000) ("The marriage ceremony shall be performed in the presence of two
competent witnesses of full age.").
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the newspapers in the locality of the celebrants. It is for this
reason that announcements are commonly published for
persons who no longer live in the community served by the
newspaper. 1' Because one or both members of the couple retain
significant ties to the former domicile, announcement there
serves to inform family and friends in the area whom the
couple will expect to treat them as a married unit.
1 72
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that
withholding marriage from gay couples raises not simply
humanitarian concerns, but also constitutional ones. Granting
the right to marry without also protecting the elements of
marriage that have historically justified its status as a
fundamental civil right would be rather pointless. Given that
public recognition directly effects a critical dimension of
marriage-that is, its ability to endure, and the quality of its
experiential aspects' 7'-then impliedly the withholding of that
recognition could also implicate constitutional issues. One
recognized method of public recognition in our society has been
the publication of announcements in local newspapers. The
discriminatory practice of newspapers denying equal access to
their pages for such announcements denies gay couples the
public support critical to the maintenance of their
relationships, and thereby functions to "interfere[] with the
exercise of [their] fundamental right" to marry.1
7 4
Publication of same-sex union announcements in
community newspapers, therefore, involves issues central to
the struggle to achieve equality for same-sex couples: "To a
very large degree, we aren't just who we say we are, we are
who the society pages say we are."'75 As such, how newspapers
treat announcements of newly-formalized same-sex
171 This, for example, is one of the criteria for the Times-Picayune.
Announcements must "evidence [a] connection between the couple and the New
Orleans area . . . ." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction Ex. B, Affidavit of James Amoss at 2, Times
Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A95-518N, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4842 (La. App. 4th Cir. April 13, 1995).
172 One study of gay male couples identified only two sources of conflict in the
relationship recognized by over one-fifth of the study population: Financial
disagreements and lack of support from family members. See Raymond M. Berger, Men
Together: Understanding the Gay Couple, 19(3) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 31, 42 (1990).
173 "[Sltate-approved marriage is good for all couples because it creates
additional advantages for the relationship and a big barrier to breakups." ESKRIDGE,
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 102, at 112.
174 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
175 Bronski, supra note 88.
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relationships merits the fullest examination under all
applicable constitutional analyses.
III. THE THRESHOLD INQUIRY INTO PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION NONDISCRIMINATION
The Times-Picayune complaint, as well as the
Oregonian case, involved public accommodations laws that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
17 6
This Article limits its analysis to those states and
municipalities with similar public accommodations laws.
Although local public accommodation laws vary, many
enumerate prohibited discriminatory acts, and define what
constitutes a public accommodation. The Massachusetts law,
for example, prohibits an "owner, lessee, proprietor, manager,
superintendent, agent or employee of any public
accommodation" from "actually discriminating against persons
of any religious sect, creed, class, race, . . . sex, sexual
orientation... in the full enjoyment of the accommodations...
offered to the general public by such places of public
accommodation, resort or amusement. 1 7  The statute then
defines public accommodation as "any place,... which is open
to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public."'78
The definition goes on to list ten illustrative examples of public
accommodations, including: "(1) an inn, tavern, hotel ... (6) a
boardwalk or other public highway . . . (8) a place of public
amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment."
7 9
The threshold issue for complaints under laws like the
Massachusetts statute is whether the applicable public
accommodations law extends to include the local newspaper. If
it does not, then the legal basis for alleging discrimination
through failure to publish union announcements fails, and the
complaint must be dismissed. In that vein, The Oregonian
court observed in dismissing the complaint that "[t]here is no
precedent holding news space to be a public accommodation."
180
The implication is that finding newspapers to be public
... See PCC § 23.01.070, cited in Linebarier v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., No..96-
875554, slip op. at 2 (Or. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996).
177 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (2002).
178 Id.
179 Id. See also infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text, discussing the
New Orleans ordinance.
180 Linebarier, No. 96-875554, slip op. at 3-4.
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accommodations is somehow antithetical to what should be a
"public accommodation," and to the very nature of newspapers
themselves. This Part demonstrates that while courts have
never explicitly construed newspapers to be public
accommodations, there is nothing in the nature of newspapers
that prevents such a finding. In other words, nothing intrinsic
to newspapers shields them from classification as public
accommodations if the applicable law would permit that result.
A. Baseline Precedent of Hurley
A leading public accommodations case is Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.1' In
Hurley, organizers of the annual St. Patrick's Day parade
refused to allow a group of openly gay Irish descendants to
march in the parade.8 The gay group sued the parade
organizers, arguing that the exclusion of the gay club violated
the state public accommodations law and state and federal
constitutions. The state court agreed with the plaintiffs that
the parade fell within the public accommodations law and
required the organizers to include the gay group. 1" The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed unanimously, holding that forcing a
parade sponsor to include a contingent of gay marchers
violated the free speech rights of the organizers."'
Unfortunately, the Court dealt ineffectively with the
public accommodations aspect of the case. The Supreme Court
did not quibble with the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts's finding that the parade was a public
accommodation under state law.'86 Rather, the Supreme Court
181 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
182 Id. at 561.
183 Id.
18 Id. at 561-62. The state courts found that the parade fit the statutory
definition as either a "boardwalk, or other public highway" or as "a place of
amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment." Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, 418 Mass. 238, 247-48 (1994). See also supra notes
176-78 and accompanying text. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed
the trial court's conclusions that the parade did not contain expressive elements and
thus the First Amendment did not protect it, and that the parade did not involve state
action. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563-64.
185 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566. Hurley is but the latest in a series of attempts
by gays and lesbians to be included in parade events. The first may have been in 1986,
when gay veterans sought unsuccessfully to be included in an American Legion parade.
See Paul Siegel, Lesbian and Gay Rights as a Free Speech Issue: A Review of Relevant
Caselaw, 21(1/2) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 203, 249 (1991).
186 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570-74.
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objected to the application of the public accommodations law so
that it "had the effect of declaring the sponsors' speech itself to
be a public accommodation."187 Finding that "one important
manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who
chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say,' 18 the Court
held that Massachusetts could not force the parade sponsor to
promulgate a message it preferred to avoid. Gays could
(presumably) march as members of other groups, but not under
their own banner.
As far as it goes, Hurley seems correctly decided. The
decision, however, lacks an explanation as to why its reasoning
would not apply to all, or at least some, other public
accommodations. The confusion arises from the two variables
interacting in Hurley, the type of discrimination, and the form
of public accommodation. The path from the facts to the result
is less than obvious. Imagine two forms of public
accommodation, a parade and a hotel.9 Imagine also two types
of discrimination, by race and by sexual orientation. Although
Hurley instructs us as to the outcome of the parade-sexual
orientation combination, its reasoning does not directly
illuminate the outcome required by the other combinations.
Would Hurley have been decided differently if the
excluded group had been African-Americans or women,
demographic categories that both receive heightened scrutiny
from the courts?9 ° Perhaps, but present concerns force a
critique of Hurley from the other direction. Controlling for the
type of discrimination, does Hurley stand for the proposition
that other forms of public accommodations can now also
exclude gay men and lesbians, at least when they are in self-
identified groups? It does not suffice to point out that Hurley
found decisive the expressive nature of parades. Hotel
establishments can also express a point of view.'9' The relevant
1"7 Id. at 573.
188 Id.
189 A hotel is an explicit category of a public accommodation under many laws,
including the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (2002). For a
related example of a restaurant being prohibited from restricting use of semi-private
booths to heterosexual romantic couples, see Rolan v. Kulwitzky, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1984).
'go Race receives "the most rigid scrutiny." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); the Court extended intermediate scrutiny to sex in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
19, The Sandals resorts, for example, strictly enforce a heterosexual couples
only policy. See Straight-only Resort Can't Advertise on British Television,
ADVOCATE.COM, July 6, 2001, at http://www.advocate.com/newnews.asp?id=1638&sd-
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differences distinguishing hotels from parades are clearly
quantitative, and not qualitative, as indicated by the Court's
attempt to characterize parades as being primarily expressive
conduct or symbolic speech.'92 Hotels, by contrast, would be
reasonably construed to be expressive in only some secondary,
derivative sense that is less strictly protected. Hotels are, in
other words, primarily commercial, and it is this expressive-
commercial dichotomy and the primacy of expression in a
parade that seemingly determined the outcome of Hurley.
This dichotomy, taken from Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, looks to the
principal goal of the enterprise.9 The purpose of a hotel is to
generate commercial profits, while the purpose of a parade is to
express an idea. Although hotels can be expressive, or parades
profitable, these characteristics are only incidental to their
primary purposes. A commercial establishment is accorded less
flexibility in its discriminatory practices than an expressive
establishment, as an extension of the idea that commercial
speech may be regulated to a greater extent than expressive
speech.' Therefore, a hotel's practices of exclusion will be
censurable while a parade's exclusions will be protected. Under
this analysis, censure of discriminatory practices is determined
by the relation of the prohibited discrimination to the
organization's primary purpose, commercial or expressive.
The Hurley Court, unfortunately, never identified this
dichotomy as the critical issue controlling its decision. Even if
it had, however, all problems would not be resolved. Both
conditions of "commercial" and "expressive" admit of degrees,
and the Hurley opinion does not suggest how hybrid situations
are to be handled. While the parade will be protected as
expressive, what is the status of the official parade vendors on
the side? How "expressive" must a public accommodation be
=07/06/01 (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); C. Barillas, Microsoft Ends Affiliation with Anti-
Gay Resort, DATA LOUNGE, Feb. 3, 1999, at http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/ne-
ws/record.html?record=3889 (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
192 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
193 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 638 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Minnesota's attempt to
regulate the membership of the Jaycees chapters operating in that State presents a
relatively easy case for application of the expressive-commercial dichotomy."). See also
infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text, discussing the Roberts decision.
194 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 ("[Tihere is only minimal constitutional protection
of the freedom of commercial association.").
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before it merits constitutional protection from local
nondiscrimination ordinances?95
Despite these shortcomings, Hurley presumptively
would support a newspaper's argument that even if the
newspaper were found to be a public accommodation,
government pressure to convey a message that it does not
support (e.g., one that can be construed as support of same-sex
unions) would violate its First Amendment rights. Further
analysis, however, shows why this confidence may be
misplaced. First, I identify the contexts in which a newspaper
can be found to be a public accommodation.
B. Public Accommodation Analysis
Based on Hurley, a newspaper would seem to have firm
warrant for its position that the government cannot force it to
communicate a message (in this case, an acceptance of same-
sex relationships) that it chooses not to convey, even if it is a
public accommodation. 9 ' If a newspaper is not a public
accommodation, the issue would not even arise.
Most union announcement plaintiffs seek to frame
"public accommodation" to include newspapers, although the
statute or ordinance involved does not explicitly include
newspapers. As discussed above, the Hurley decision was likely
based upon the Court's understanding of the primarily
expressive nature of parades, but the Court offered no analysis
of the relationship between a parade's expressivity and the
status of a parade as a public accommodation. This lacuna will
be telling if courts find newspapers, or at least the society
pages therein (as opposed to the news and editorial pages), to
be public accommodations. The reasoning of Hurley cannot
sensibly apply to all public accommodations without effectively
negating all nondiscrimination laws. The Court, however, gave
little guidance as to when a public accommodation is primarily
expressive (other than parades) or when these laws interfere
with the accommodations' First Amendment rights.
195 See discussion infra Part I.D.1.
19 This reliance would be strengthened by the fact that the Hurley Court
itself found similarities between parades and newspapers. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
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1. Are Newspapers "Public Accommodations"?
Before broaching the problem of applying Hurley to the
present scenario, I consider whether a newspaper is a public
accommodation at all. Since local antidiscrimination laws vary,
for present purposes I focus on the New Orleans ordinance
controlling the Times-Picayune.
"Public accommodation" is currently defined in the New
Orleans City Code as:
[any place, store, or other establishment or means of transportation,
either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods or services to the
general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of
the general public, or which is supported directly or indirectly by
government funds.'97
Although the statutory definition of "public accommodation"
lists several exemptions,' none extend to newspapers. A
newspaper could arguably fall within the scope of the definition
as an "establishment ... that solicits or accepts the patronage
... of the general public."
199
Public accommodations are forbidden, on the basis of
sexual orientation, from
(1) [discriminating] ... by refusing, withholding or denying to such
person any of the goods, services, accommodations, advantages,
facilities or privileges offered by the public accommodation, . . . by:
a. Placing or attempting to place any person in a separate
class of customers, patrons,... in a separate section or area
of the... facilities of the public accommodation ....
197 City Code of New Orleans, § 86-1.5, at CD86:5. See also supra notes 177-79
and accompanying text, discussing the Massachusetts statute.
198 The exceptions include "bona fide private clubs" of many types. City Code
of New Orleans, § 86-1.5, at CD86:5.
'9 Use of the word "establishment" might introduce confusion into the present
analysis if that term is taken to require a physical "bricks and mortar" entity to qualify
as a public accommodation. Courts have debated that issue, and at least some have
decided in the negative. For example, when construing the ADA public
accommodations sections, the First Circuit overturned a ruling by the district court
that placed a strict interpretation on the term "place of public accommodation." See
Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1994).
The plain meaning of the terms do not require "public accommodations" to
have physical structures for persons to enter. Even if the meaning of "public
accommodation" is not plain, it is, at worst, ambiguous. This ambiguity,
considered together with agency regulations and public policy concerns,
persuades us that the phrase is not limited to actual physical structures.
Id. at 21-22. Construing "establishment" to include newspapers (and it is necessary
that the term include the product or service, and not merely the corporation) is in
keeping with that line of broad interpretation.
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(2) [publishing or] circulat[ing] ... any... communication, notice or
advertisement to the effect that any of the services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges of any public accommodation...
200
will be refused, withheld, or denied to any person.
If a newspaper is a public accommodation, then its refusal to
grant access to the society pages to gay men and lesbians for
the purpose of announcing their unions, likely would violate
the nondiscrimination ordinance in two ways. 1  First,
withholding that service violates section (1) because that act
would deny privileges available from the newspaper, such as
appearance in the society pages, based on the prohibited
criterion of sexual orientation. Second, if the newspaper
publishes or circulates any advance notice of its intent to
withhold that service, it then violates section (2) because such
notice publicizes the newspaper's prior intent to restrict access
to its services based upon the prohibited criterion of sexual
orientation.
No court has found a newspaper to be a public
accommodation. However, neither has a court ever held that
newspapers are inherently immune from being categorized as
public accommodations. Despite frequent suits that seek to
treat newspapers as public accommodations, they have thus far
avoided such categorization only because of the specific
language of the local ordinance or statute defining public
accommodation status.
For example, in Treanor v. Washington Post Co., 202 a
disabled author who wrote a book chronicling disabled civil
rights history sued the newspaper for refusing to publish a
review of the book. He claimed that such a refusal violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The court found that
the newspaper was not a public accommodation as that term is
defined in the ADA.23  The ADA identifies public
accommodations largely through an extensive list of
examples. 204 This list does not include newspapers, and the
200 City Code of New Orleans, § 86-33, at CD86:24.
20' This argument does not require that the newspaper also be expected to
announce couplings of unmarried heterosexuals, because unmarried heterosexuals are
not similarly situated as unmarriageable same-sex couples. See Donovan, An Ethical
Argument, supra note 139, at 655-69.
202 826 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1993).
203 Id. at 569.
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994). The public accommodations covered by the
ADA are defined by twelve extensive categories. See id. § 12181(7). These include:
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court could not analogize newspapers to anything on the list.0 5
The court further found that such a plain meaning reading of
the statute circumvented potential First Amendment
conflicts .26
The same search for analogies precluded a Wisconsin
court from deeming a local newspaper a public accommodation
under state law."7  In Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite
Information Network, Inc., the newspaper refused an
advertisement from a gay and lesbian organization. 8 The court
stated that "the newspaper's classified advertising section
[was] so dissimilar from the businesses listed in the statute
that it [did] not come within the purview of the public
accommodations act."0 9 Significantly, the court rendered its
decision in favor of the newspaper solely on the basis of
statutory construction; the court refused to address "the
constitutionality of any act, rule or order requiring a
newspaper to publish any specific item."210
Another Wisconsin case, however, left open the
possibility that a newspaper could be a public accommodation.
In Painters Union Local 802 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., a
newspaper sued to enjoin the state Equal Opportunities
Commission from pursuing a complaint from a labor union
after the newspaper refused to accept its ad. The newspaper
claimed it was free to refuse the ad because it was not a "public
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging.. .; (B) a restaurant, bar, or
other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a motion picture house,
theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of public exhibition or
entertainment; (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other
place of public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store . . .or
other sales or rental establishment; (F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank,
barber shop, beauty shop ... or other service establishment; (G) a terminal,
depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; (H) a
museum, library, gallery, or other place of display or collection; [as are
places] of (I) ... recreation; (J) ... education; (K) ... social service[s] ... ; and
(L)... exercise ....
Id.
205 See Treanor, 826 F. Supp. at 569. See also Brown v. Tenet Paraamerica
Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that in ADA cases
defendant must be analogous to one of the law's explicitly identified examples of public
accommodations). For a discussion of the problems with using lists as definitions, see
Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?, supra note 130, at 25-30.
20 Treanor, 826 F. Supp. at 569.
201 See Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 873,
876 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 877.
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place of accommodation."211 The court granted the Commission's
motion to dismiss, implying the EOC might have a colorable
argument that not accepting the advertisement was
discriminatory under the public accommodation law.212 Because
the matter settled, the court did not definitively rule on
whether the newspaper indeed fell within the ambit of the
relevant definition of "public accommodation." One
commentator noted that the joint implication of these two
Wisconsin cases is that "[a]pparently, newspaper advertising is
not a public accommodation for gays, but is a public
accommodation for labor unions."2 2
While a court has yet to hold a newspaper to be a public
accommodation under a statutory list scheme, a newspaper
could be so categorized under state and municipal public
accommodation laws using alternative statutory schemes.2 4
Laws have typically defined public accommodations through a
list of examples, leaving the court to decide if a newspaper is
analogous to any of them. Almost always it is not. But because
the New Orleans ordinance does not include a list of exemplars,
that use of analogical reasoning would not apply. Since a
plaintiff could establish that a newspaper is a public
accommodation, at least under a noninclusive list scheme, the
next question focuses on whether such a categorization is
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
2. Are Newspapers Exempted from Public
Accommodations Laws Because of Their
Expressivity?
If a newspaper is found to be a public accommodation,
reason dictates that it will be subject to the same regulation as
all other public accommodations. It is here that the explanatory
lacuna of Hurley creates an interpretative difficulty.2 5 In
211 Painters Union Local 802 v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., No. 3165 (Equal
Opportunity Comm'n, Madison Wis. file closed Dec. 24, 1987). See Martha M. Ertman,
Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1147 n.163 (1996). See also P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D.
SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE 371, 545
(2001).
212 See Ertman, supra note 211, at 1147 n.163.
213 Id.
214 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text discussing the
Massachusetts law, and notes 197-200 and accompanying text discussing the New
Orleans ordinance.
215 See supra Part III.A.
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Hurley, the parade was a public accommodation, but the Court
exempted it from the requirement that it not discriminate in
expressive activities."6 Either Hurley is a jurisprudential
aberration, limited only to parades (thus offering no solace to
other public accommodations, including newspapers), or
something about this kind of public accommodation demanded
the exemption from a nondiscrimination law.
Assuming the latter, the task is to discern the special
character of parades that commanded this result. Once the
special character is discerned, one can apply it to other
examples of public accommodations, including newspapers, to
see if the same outcome is required. As discussed above, it does
not suffice to point to the expressivity of the parade; any public
accommodation can be expressive. The controlling inquiry will
be whether expression is the primary purpose of the
establishment, as opposed to an incidental by-product.
Establishments whose expression is central to the mission of
the organization will receive greater deference than those
whose expression is epiphenomenal.
An initial assumption would be that newspapers are
primarily expressive, and as such fall within the holding of
Hurley even if newspapers are, like parades, public
accommodations. This assumption, however, is flawed. The
expressivity of the parade forces the Hurley result because in
that case the critical expressivity is coterminous with the
parade as a totality. The message of the parade organizers
comprises the parade as a whole with no remainder, without
any discernible and severable parts of the parade to which this
expressive quality might not extend. This reading also squares
Hurley with previous Supreme Court precedent, especially
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.217
In contrast, newspapers are not exclusively expressive.
Prior decisions have found newspapers to be less homogeneous
than the parades in Hurley. Two cases demonstrate this point
that the expressivity of the newspaper does not extend to all
sections; what a newspaper can say on the editorial pages it
216 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) ("[T]he state courts' application of the statute had the [impermissible] effect
of declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public accommodation.").
217 468 U.S. 609, 638 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("Minnesota's attempt to regulate the membership of the Jaycees
chapters operating in that State presents a relatively easy case for application of the
expressive-commercial dichotomy.") See also infra notes 275-86 and accompanying text,
discussing Roberts.
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cannot say in other sections, such as the classified
advertisements. In the first case, Ragin v. New York Times
Co.,218 the plaintiffs accused the newspaper of violating the Fair
Housing Act because the models appearing in housing
advertisement illustrations where mostly white, and, when
black models appeared, they were associated with less
desirable real estate locations. 19 Against the Times's objection
that ordering it to conform its ads to the requirements of the
Fair Housing Act would "compromise the unique position of the
free press,"22 ° the Second Circuit held that "real estate
advertisements that indicate a racial preference 'further an
illegal commercial activity' . . . [and as such] are
constitutionally unprotected."21 While a newspaper should be
free to use its editorial space to advocate that housing should
be racially segregated, even against a congressional law to the
contrary, noneditorial sections of the paper may not advance
that same opinion.
Ragin based its holding in part on the second case,
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.222 In Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court found that
segregation of employment advertisements into male- or
female-preferred columns violated a local human relations
ordinance, and that the First Amendment did not protect this
activity. 23 The Court was "unpersuaded" by the newspaper's
argument that the placement of the advertisements in the
newspaper layout removed those "actions from the category of
commercial speech," and were therefore unregulable.12 4 It is
important for present purposes to note that the Court did not
hold that these placement decisions were themselves
commercial speech. The Court held only that requiring the
newspaper to comply with the ordinance did not violate its
First Amendment rights.
Pittsburgh Press provides a clear precedent for the
requirement that in some circumstances the press must
conform noneditorial (albeit expressive) content to other laws,
including public accommodations ordinances. The present
218 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
219 See id. at 998.
220 Id. at 1003.
221 Id. at 1002.
222 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
223 Id. at 391.
224 Id. at 388.
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argument for publication of same-sex union announcements,
therefore, does not break entirely new ground, but only seeks to
extend established rules to new facts. One might try to
distinguish same-sex union announcements by noting that
Ragin and Pittsburgh Press involved "illegal commercial
activity"225 whose regulation was not prohibited by the First
Amendment."6  Newspapers would rebut that union
announcements are not commercial speech, and therefore these
decisions are not applicable. However, union announcements
may be deemed commercial speech under the proper analysis,
thereby placing them firmly within the Pittsburgh Press
holding.
I propose that announcements are more closely
analogous to commercial than to editorial speech.227  If
Pittsburgh Press requires categorizing the material as one or
the other-and that certainly is the lesson of O'Connor's
Roberts concurrence-the more appropriate choice is
commercial speech. The logical progression toward this
conclusion is clarified below.
While the Ragin and Pittsburgh Press decisions speak in
terms of commercial speech, the facts of the cases complicate
such simple analysis. In both cases, the issue was not the direct
commercial speech of the advertisers, but the treatment of that
commercial speech by the newspapers-in the case of Ragin,
attaching racially discriminatory illustrations, and in
Pittsburgh Press, arranging the employment ads into sexually
exclusive columns. The appropriateness of the ads themselves,
when that has become an issue, may be severable from the
elements of the complaints directed toward the newspaper. 28
From this perspective, the fundamental issue was not that the
speech involved was commercial, but that it did not rise to the
225 Id.
226 See id. at 391.
21 See infra Part Iv.C.
228 See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 384 ("[S]peech is not rendered
commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement."). As a technical
matter, the complaint against Pittsburgh Press was that it aided the advertisers; aid is
a far cry from "commercial speech" as ordinarily understood, as "speech proposing a
commercial transaction." See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980). Although the Court expressed skepticism about how the
newspaper's placement of the ad interacted with the commercial speech of the
advertisers, Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 387 ("[W]e are not persuaded that . . . the
actual placement there lifts the newspaper's actions from the category of commercial
speech"), the Court held only that enforcement of the antidiscrimination ordinance did
not infringe upon the newspaper's First Amendment rights. Id. at 391.
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standard of protected editorial speech. Assuming speech must
fit into either the commercial or expressive category, the
newspapers' speech was clearly, albeit uneasily, commercial.
Because union announcements are non-editorial speech,229 the
lessons of Ragin and Pittsburgh Press are immediately
applicable.
The logical conclusion is thus clear. Newspapers may be
categorized as public accommodations, although this outcome
depends upon the specific details of the applicable law. If the
statutory definition includes an exemplary list of
representative public accommodations, and if that list includes
neither newspapers explicitly nor some other example to which
newspapers can be analogized, then categorizing newspapers
as public accommodations will be difficult. In situations,
however, where the law does not include an illustrative list,
that outcome is more easily obtained. While no court has found
a newspaper to be a public accommodation, neither has one
reasoned that this result is precluded due to the unique status
that newspapers enjoy under the Constitution. If a court finds
a newspaper to be a public accommodation, Hurley2"' will
protect only its expressive sections-either directly or in
conjunction with other cases such as Pittsburgh Press231 and
Roberts.232 Pittsburgh Press would be especially instructive,
because it found advertising sections to fall outside the
umbrella of protected editorial expression.2 3 The logical result
is that society pages are more closely analogous to unprotected
classifieds than to protected editorials.
IV. THE NEWS STATUS OF UNION ANNOUNCEMENTS
If a party satisfies the threshold criterion of the public
accommodation status of the newspaper, inquiry shifts to what
kind of speech the rejected announcement represents. The
critical distinction is whether a social announcement qualifies
as "news" or editorial speech, or whether the announcement is
commercial speech.24 While a claimant may prevail in both
229 See infra Part W.A.
230 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
231 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
232 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
233 413 U.S. at 391.
234 As I conceive it, "news" and "editorial speech" relate to two intersecting
(not always neatly) areas. On the one hand, I think of "editorial speech" as a
superordinate category, of which "news" is a subset. Not everything in the paper is
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situations, the grounds for attaining each outcome are distinct.
Section A considers situations where announcements are not
"news" or editorial speech, and as such are not protected by
either the Free Press or Free Speech Clauses of the First
Amendment. Section B considers what arguments might apply
in situations where society announcements are protected forms
of speech. Even in these situations, however, newspapers might
still be compelled to allow access on a nondiscriminatory basis
given their arguable status as quasi-public corporations.
This discussion concludes that the status of
announcements is not an abstract determination, but is fact
intensive. The announcements in one newspaper may not
qualify as protected "news," while announcements in another
paper might, according to the degree to which editorial
judgment underlies the finished product. That the issue is one
of fact and not law is important because these discrimination
complaints rarely receive a full hearing on the facts. If such
cases did receive factual inquiries, courts could thoughtfully
consider the issues this Article raises and both clarify and
advance the law.
A. Tornillo and the Standard of Editorial Judgment
The obvious refuge for any newspaper fleeing from
governmental attempts to dictate its contents is the
Constitution.23 5 While the Constitution contains both a Free
Press and a Free Speech Clause, the protections extended to
the press are largely reducible to the protections given any
speaker. '36 A few exceptions, however, do exist.
.news," most notably the editorial opinions. I think of both as forms of editorial speech,
although only articles would qualify as "news." On the other hand, the terms mark a
distinction as to the source of constitutional protection. "News" is protected by the Free
Press clause, while editorial speech is protected by the Free Speech clause. Because of
the restricted sense in which I use the term, "news" will always appear in quotes.
235 "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. ... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136 See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429, 430
(2002). ("Most of the freedoms the press receives from the First Amendment are no
different from the freedoms everyone enjoys under the Speech Clause."). According to
David Anderson, the Free Press Clause received greatest attention from the Supreme
Court in the early part of this century. Id. at 448. The 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, "was the first case to hold that a law violated the guarantees of freedom
of the press." LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 142 (1991). Beginning in the 1970s, however, the
Court "seemed to lose its enthusiasm for the Press Clause." Anderson, supra, at 449.
Thereafter, the Court's preferred analysis was to treat "media cases as free-speech
cases rather than free-press cases." Id.
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The press holds two unique rights: taxation and
editorial autonomy.2 37  The Free Press Clause of the
Constitution protects a newspaper against demands that it
comply with nondiscrimination ordinances and thereby publish
same-sex union announcements when such compliance
undermines the editorial autonomy of the newspaper. When
compliance does not implicate editorial autonomy, the
newspaper must follow the law.
The primary authority for the position that the Free
Press Clause confers a privileged status upon editorial
judgment is Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.235 In
Tornillo, a Florida political candidate invoked a state statute
granting candidates for office a right to reply to a negative
editorial. The U.S. Supreme Court deemed the statute
unconstitutional for three reasons. First, reply rights impose
opportunity costs on newspapers. Printing a reply requires the
paper to forego printing other news or advertisements and
requires it to incur additional printing expenses. Second, reply
rights may chill speech. If an editor knows that he may bear
the expense of printing replies, he might decide to forego the
critical editorial entirely.2"9
Those two rationales do not apply, however, to the
problem of union announcements. As discussed in greater
detail below, many papers accept all submitted wedding
announcements that conform to the published submission
criteria. They expect, in other words, to publish all material
that they receive, only rejecting those that are defective. Unlike
a "right of reply" statute, then, compliance with an order to
publish same-sex union announcements will not impose
opportunity costs on a newspaper, as it will not noticeably
increase the paper's publishing costs.4 ° Since the fear of
217 Anderson, supra note 236, at 493-95. Taxation is beyond the scope of this
Article.
23 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
239 See id. at 256-57.
140 The Vermont civil union experience provides some initial insight as to
what the potential demand for same-sex union announcements might be. In the first
year that civil unions were available, 2,258 unions were recorded. David Mace, A Year
with Civil Unions, TIMES ARGUS, July 1, 2001, at http://timesargus.nybor.com/Story/-
29127.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2002). Only 20% of this number (or 463) involved at
least one Vermonter, id., and thus this would be the number of announcements that all
Vermont newspapers would, in theory, be expected to publish. As that number may
include a "backlog" of couples waiting to formalize their relationships, the annual
number could be expected to fall in subsequent years. More recent statistics on
Vermont civil unions are available from Vermont's Civil Unions, PROVIDENCE J., Oct.
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increased costs cannot act as a prior restraint-preventing the
newspaper, presumably, from publishing any announcements
at all-this reasoning of Tornillo does not apply to the present
study.
More relevant is the third Tornillo rationale, that
mandatory speech, like a right of reply, intrudes on editorial
autonomy."' Although the Court left this principle largely
unexplained, it seemed to rely on two constitutional
interpretations. First, the First Amendment proscribes state
action rather than compelling the press to act. In other words,
it does not require the press to be responsible. Second, the First
Amendment, supported by the Fifth Amendment,42 prohibits
the state from compelling speech. The Hurley Court relied on
this principle for its holding that the parade organizers had the
right to control their message.243 According to Tornillo:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a
compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of
news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails
13, 2002, at http://www.projo.com/yourlife/content/projo-2021013-gaysidex.a7954.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2002).
2' Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
242 "No person shall be .. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
575 (1995). "A newspaper is . . . 'more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising,' and we have held that 'the choice of material... and other
decisions made as to other limitations on the size and content . . . and treatment of
public issues . . . -whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial judgment'
upon which the state cannot intrude." Id. (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258).
This passage might seem to present a problem for the present argument. It
says that the "choice of material," including advertisements, is beyond the intrusion of
the State. As I have at times analogized social announcements to classified
advertisements, this dicta in Hurley might undermine the thesis I defend. But as a
general rule, this statement from the Court is inaccurate, since it ignores its earlier
case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973), which did allow governmental interference with newspaper advertising
practices. The statement, therefore, must be read in the limited context in which it is
offered. In the context of the issue in Tornillo, the statement does not claim that the
named parts of the newspaper are beyond governmental interference, but only that
those parts of the paper upon which the newspaper exercises choice are protected. The
proper inquiry is not into the type of material the government seeks to regulate, but
whether the regulation interferes with editorial choice. Typology is only useful to the
extent that it informs about that choice. Some genera of material, such as editorials, by
their very natures entail significant elements of choice. Other types, such as
advertisements and announcements, provide no intrinsic insight about the amount of
choice involved in their publication. This problem of choice, or "retail level judgment,"
is addressed in detail infra Part IV.C.1.
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to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion
into the function of editors.2 4
Editorial judgment requires that something be added to the
information beyond that available from those "who merely
compile and distribute information."245 Without this "something
extra," the "press" is indistinguishable from all the other
innumerable information providers in today's market. Thus, for
Tornillo to apply and shield a newspaper from
antidiscrimination laws, the newspaper must demonstrate that
union announcements are the product of editorial judgment.
In trying to define the "press" protected by the Free
Press Clause, one usually draws attention to this value-added
editorial function. In a word, the Free Press Clause protects
"news" where it may not protect mere entertainment, fiction or
other forms of expressive works.146 The question then boils
down to whether wedding announcements constitute "news" in
the sense required by the Free Press Clause as construed by
Tornillo. Determining what qualifies as "news" can be
problematic, but analysis should focus on the purpose of the
Free Press Clause: to protect "activity that reflects independent
choice of information and opinion of current value, directed to
public need, and borne of non-self-interested purposes."247 By
this definition, wedding announcements are not "news."
'" Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
245 Anderson, supra note 236, at 445.
246 See Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78
NEB. L. REv. 754, 855 (1999) (arguing that works of fiction, history, poetry,
entertainment and art are protected as speech but not as "press" publications). See also
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 ("[Tlhe First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable
barrier between government and the print media so far as government tampering, in
advance of publication, where news and editorial content is concerned.") (White, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
2A7 Bezanson, supra note 246, at 856. The meaning of the Free Press Clause is
especially fluid when compared to other constitutional phrases, because "it is simply
impossible to turn to discussions by the framers ... for definitive answers on the scope
of the freedom of the press." POWE, supra note 236, at 23. The logic for this special
protection of the press is as follows: "Americans maintained . . .that sovereignty
derived from the people's continuous assent. Continuous assent meant continuous
scrutiny. The sovereign people needed information and the ability to discuss freely how
their government was performing." Id. at 27. This view that "[t]he primary purpose of
the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand
the issues which bear upon our common life" is derived from the works of Alexander
Meiklejohn. Id. at 171 (quoting Meiklejohn).
Powe identifies three theories to justify the constitutional protections of
the freedom of the press (and of speech): (1) the checking theory; (2) the marketplace of
ideas theory; and (3) the self-government theory. The checking theory is grounded "in
distrust," and serves to counterbalance the government's tendency to suppress contrary
opinion. This theory is the basis of the "Fourth Estate" analogy of the press advanced
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B. Bezanson's Criteria to Find Editorial Judgment
Professor Randall Bezanson distills the relevant case
law to isolate three criteria to ascertain whether material is
protected "news":...
[T]o qualify as editorial judgment by the press, the choice of material
(i) must concern information and opinion of current value to the
public, or to an undifferentiated audience of interested consumers of
non-fictional current information; (ii) must be made independently,
oriented to the audience's needs as well as preferences; and (iii) must
be grounded on a judgment about the specific content being
published. These three criteria aptly describe the paradigmatic
qualities of editorial judgments concerning "news". ..24
Announcements in at least some contexts fail to satisfy all
three standards and, consequently will not be "news." I
consider those cases first. The announcements in other
newspapers will, however, satisfy Bezanson's criteria. In
Section D, I consider whether an announcement's status as
"news" dispositively settles the matter in the paper's favor, or
whether, even in that setting, arguments could still be
marshaled to pressure a newspaper to accept and publish the
same-sex union announcement.
C. When Society Announcements are Not "News"
Bezanson isolated three criteria that must be satisfied if
material is to be categorized as "news" and therefore protected
under the Free Press Clause: (1) the material must be private
and not public; (2) the purpose behind the newspaper's decision
to publish such announcements must be non-self-interested;
and (3) the selection of that material requires "retail-level
judgments." I address these criteria in reverse order.
so strongly by Justice Stewart. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631
(1975). The marketplace theory "rests on a belief in objective truth and in the
predominance of rational thought, and an almost religious faith that truth will prevail
... ' POWE, supra note 236, at 239. The self-government theory articulated by
Meiklejohn was described above. Id. at 238-39. Meiklejohn's theory is especially
relevant to the present discussion, because it "carries the potential to exclude from
protection anything that does not provide information about issues on which citizens
may be called on to vote." Id. at 239; cf. discussion infra Part IV.D.2. Because union
announcements are not a topic open to citizen vote, the First Amendment would not
extend to this kind of material under a self-government theory analysis.
248 Professor Randall Bezanson is recognized as "[tihe scholar who has written
most extensively about the legal meaning of the press." Anderson, supra note 236, at
451.
249 Bezanson, supra note 246, at 830.
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1. Retail-Level Judgments
By "retail-level judgments" Bezanson means that
publishers must choose to publish each piece, thereby
transforming what may have been originally another's work
"into the publisher's own expression.""' Where a newspaper
obviates selection by deciding to publish wholesale "the
messages of several advertisers, political and/or commercial,
convey[ing] a diffuse array of messages and therefore fail[ing]
to meet the paradigmatic quality of an editorial judgment,"2 1
such wholesale adoption of others' speech devoid of retail-level
judgment "is entitled to lesser or . . . no First Amendment
protection under the free press guarantee."252
Some newspapers fail to exercise editorial judgments
about society announcements at the retail-level, thereby,
according to Bezanson's analysis, forfeiting free press
protections for these materials. It is not uncommon for papers
to mechanically accept announcement materials that are
properly and timely submitted. Papers formulaically recompose
these submissions, which perhaps requires artistry but not
subjective editorial judgment.252 In other words, "choice" is not
an element of the decision either to publish or not, or of the
content of the announcement.
The Editor-in-Chief of the Times-Picayune described the
limited nature of union announcement composition:
After the form is filled out and submitted, a Times-Picayune editorial
assistant writes an article announcing the wedding or engagement
using the information contained in the form. After the article is
drafted, an Assistant Editor of the Living Section checks the article
against the form to ensure the accuracy of the article and compliance
with format requirements....
25 Id. at 808.
251 Id. at 810 (discussing United Mine Workers v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343 (W.
Va. 1983)).
252 Id.
253 Recall that, according to Bezanson's analysis, art and fiction are not
protected under the Free Press Clause-at the very least that is an accurate summary
of the current jurisprudence, and it also will quite likely prove an influential
assessment about where the boundary of the Clause will continue to be drawn in the
future. In contrast to the formulaic process of the Times-Picayune is the more article-
oriented approach of the New York Times, which actually uses reporters to interview
selected couples, for some announcements rather than relying on submitted forms. See
Margery Eagan, New Week's Times: Mr. Rich Weds Mr. Famous, BOSTON HERALD, Aug.
25, 2002, at 13.
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The Times-Picayune determines the order in which information
provided on the form will be presented in the article. In addition,
information submitted which is considered inappropriate or which is
not called for by the form is not published in the article. Articles
about engagements submitted too late to be published prior to the
wedding date are not published; articles about weddings submitted
too late after the wedding are not published. Articles which make
inaccurate statements about the parentage of the engaged or wedded
couple ... are not published. Articles which evidence no connection
between the couple and the New Orleans area are not published.
Until approximately three years ago, only articles announcing first
marriages were published. Finally, only a wedding article or an
engagement article, not both, is published for each couple.
Occasionally, persons wishing to have articles published in a manner
inconsistent with the policies described above have offered to pay for
publication of the articles in the manner they desire. The Times-
Picayune has refused to deviate from its policies . . . desired
announcements which do not conform to the Times-Picayune's
policies for wedding or engagement articles can be published only as
2,94paid advertisements.
Noticeably absent in this long description of the creation of
published wedding announcements are the very criteria
necessary to qualify those announcements as news. First, no
mention is made of any choice about whether to publish.255 That
decision is based on mechanical application of established
guidelines. Second, wedding announcements do not deviate
from form, even if the party is willing to pay for the added
expense, further proving the absence of editorial discretion. All
announcements, according to the Times-Picayune Editor,
conform to this cookie-cutter production process. Whatever the
virtues of this process, it demonstrably lacks the requisite
editorial judgment to satisfy the retail judgment criterion, and
thus fails to qualify the end product as "news." Therefore, the
Free Press Clause does not protect these announcements.
24 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction Ex. B, Affidavit of James Amoss, at 2-3, Times Picayune Publ'g
Corp. v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A95-518N, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4842 (La. App.
4th Cir. April 13, 1995).
255 This is not to suggest that where choice is exercised, that fact is dispositive
of the claims being asserted. For example, although university admissions involve
"choice," they are not entitled to discriminate. But the fact of choice being exercised
would render the analysis more complex.
2003]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
2. Non-Self Interest
Protected material must, according to Bezanson's
second criterion, be "made independently and with a public, not
a private orientation.""5 6 The Free Speech Clause may still
protect self-interested expression, but that speech would not
garner additional Free Press Clause protection, "which is
governed by the ethic of disseminating material deemed
important for a public readership and selected by a process of
reason and audience-oriented (and thus not strictly personal)
judgment."257 Union announcements fail this criterion because
the paper's motivation to publish them is not non-self-
interested. Why, one might reasonably ask, do newspapers
assume the trouble and burden-and in many instances, the
costs---of publishing this material? What, in other words, is
their "motive"?
Bezanson's criterion of non-self interest mirrors the civil
law question of an obligation's "cause." Louisiana, a civil law
jurisdiction lacks the common law doctrine of consideration258
and instead, applies a theory of cause.
According to its Civil Code, "[aln obligation cannot exist
without a lawful cause."259 "Cause" is subsequently defined as
"the reason why a party obligates himself."26 ° Denying what the
common law doctrine of consideration explicitly requires, the
comment to the Louisiana statute notes: "Under this Article,
'cause' is not 'consideration.' The reason why a party binds
himself need not be to obtain something in return or to secure
an advantage for himself."'' This effectively voids the bargain
theory of consideration in Louisiana. The next sentence is
especially important for present purposes: "An obligor may
bind himself by a gratuitous contract, that is, he may obligate
himself for the benefit of the other party without obtaining any
advantage in return."26 In other words, the fact that the Times-
Picayune does not receive "pecuniary consideration" for
publication of wedding announcements, even if non-self
256 Bezanson, supra note 246, at 808.
257 Id. at 757.
258 James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue about the Doctrine of Consideration, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 987, 1002 (1990).
259 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1966 (West 1987).
260 Id. art. 1967, para. 1.
261 Id. art. 1967, cmt. c.
262 Id.
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interested and thus fatal in a common law jurisdiction, is not
especially relevant under the civil law.
The civil law's emphasis on cause compels us to examine
the motive in undertaking the obligation, an issue that can get
lost in the common law's focus on consideration. At the very
least, the newspaper extends the offer to publish social
announcements to cultivate the goodwill of the community. If
newspapers run this material, people will buy the paper out of
a sense of loyalty, and they will read these items of social and
community interest even if they are uninterested in the
editorial content. That consumer pattern raises the readership
above the level of those whose interest in the paper is largely
informative-that is, above those who are attracted to the
paper because of the specific functions the Constitution
protects-and thereby makes the paper more attractive to
advertisers. By soliciting these materials, the newspaper can
fill more pages and earn greater advertising revenue, especially
from businesses connected to the topics of the
announcements-diamond companies, houseware retailers,
real estate agencies, and other providers of goods and services
a newly bonded couple could be expected to need.263
This goodwill is technically gratuitous, but is not
therefore also altruistic. Although it is an intangible,
community goodwill serves the self-interest of the newspaper.
The offer to publish is not a gift, but a smart business decision,
given the customer base most community newspapers wish to
cultivate. Publication of the announcement serves the
commercial self-interest of the paper, and not an editorial,
public good function.
If the motivation for a newspaper to publish social
announcements is primarily economic in nature, then the
newspaper's claim to Free Press protection is dubious at best
The economic benefit need not, of course, be as indirect or
hidden as with community goodwill. Many papers charge fees
for announcements, creating a direct economic benefit to the
publisher.264 It may even be that the majority of newspapers
263 One estimate places the cost of the average wedding at $15,500, making
the announcements section of great interest to advertisers. Williams, supra note 76, at
1037.
264 See, e.g., Kathleen Parker, Gay Union Announcements: Nice Problem for
Lucky People, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 4, 2002, at A17 ("In many newspapers,
including the Sentinel, these announcements won't be reportorial products of the
newspaper's staff, but paid advertisements.").
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charge to publish announcements, just as they do to run
classified ads.26 Surely these newspapers run announcements
to advance their own self-interest. That motivation is not
inappropriate, but it does remove the announcements from
material protected by the Free Press Clause.
The court in Oregonian, however, found announcements
to be "news space."2 66 Fee-based announcements are more
properly analogized to commercial speech than editorial
speech. Thus, Pittsburgh Press267  directly applies, not
Tornillo.26 s Recall that Pittsburgh Press held that enforcement
of an antidiscrimination ordinance against a newspaper that
published employment ads in sex-exclusive columns did not
infringe on the paper's First Amendment rights.69 In contrast
to the reasonably specific criteria that can be articulated to
identify "news," commercial speech is an imprecisely structured
270category, encompassing material beyond the prototypical
propositions to engage in economic activity.211 For one
counterintuitive example, the Seventh Circuit held that
responses to a questionnaire about company relations with
Israel, in contravention of U.S. Department of Commerce
regulations, were commercial speech because "the proposed
answers to the boycott questions . ..were intended only to
advance the purpose of continuing commercial dealings with
the Arab world."7 Given the imprecise and elastic universe of
commercial speech, no special justification is required to assert
that it may, at times, extend to include union announcements.
If announcements are analogous to commercial speech and are
not "news" because they fail the non-self interest test, then
regulations governing their appearance cannot be argued to
265 See David Zeeck, Same-Sex Announcements Not Yet Common in
Newspapers, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, WA), Sept. 22, 2002, at A2 ("More than 100
newspapers, including The News Tribune, accept notices of same-sex commitment
ceremonies. Most of them, including the TNT, run the notices as advertisements.").
"6 Linebarier v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., No. 96-875554 (Or. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5,
1996). The court's rationale for this conclusion rests merely on an observation that no
precedent exists to the contrary. Id. at 3-4.
267 Pittsburgh Press Co., v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
2. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
261 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 391.
270 See Stern, supra note 28, at 79.
271 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) ("[Slometimes expression that would not ordinarily be regarded as
advertising is included within the category of commercial speech.").
272 Stern, supra note 28, at 131 (discussing Briggs & Stratton Corp. v.
Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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interfere with the interests that the Free Press Clause was
intended to protect, 27 and which Tornillo was penned to
preserve.
3. Public Good
As detailed in Part II, the direct value of union
announcements is private, not public, as required by
Bezanson's third criterion. That is to say, announcements do
not inform generally on any public matter of import that
requires informing the electorate. Rather, the benefit accrues
to the couple whose announcement is published and whose
union is thereby celebrated and supported. Society as a whole
benefits indirectly through this process by gaining stable
family units necessary to build secure political bodies, but that
is not the immediate intent or function of union
announcements. For this reason, union announcements must
be classed as private goods, not public. Thus, they do not
qualify as "news" under the Bezanson test.
In order to be protected by the Free Press Clause,
published material must satisfy the three criteria isolated by
Bezanson: retail-level judgment, selection not based on the self-
interest of the newspaper and material of public, not private
value. Although lack of any one criterion would be fatal, union
announcements typically fail on all three. Announcements are
not the type of material that the Free Press Clause was
intended to protect, and as such, government regulation of that
material cannot be prohibited under this constitutional
provision.
2" The newspaper, to rebut the above argument, might look to the concurring
opinion of Cook: "Mechanical layout is not a reliable indicator that the paper is not
exercising some form of editorial discretion in deciding what to print." Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., concurring). See supra
note 7. Judge Wisdom goes on to say that "I see nothing to be gained by requiring a
trial which might enable Cook to prove that the editorial techniques which lead to
publication of wedding announcements in the Advertiser are mechanical. Those stories
are still news stories and they are not commercial advertising." Id. The problem with
Judge Wisdom's analysis is that he conflates the terms of analysis of the Press and
Speech Clauses. Having decided in Cook that announcements are not commercial
speech, he implies that they are, by default, news. But these terms relate to
distinguishable levels of analysis.
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4. Newspapers as "Quasi-Expressive" Associations
The salience of the conclusion that society
announcements are not typically protected "news" is bolstered
by the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.
Recall that in Hurley, the Supreme Court refused, with uneven
justification, to require a public accommodation to comply with
laws prohibiting nondiscrimination based on sexual
orientation.274 However, Roberts v. United States Jaycees75
indicated a different result. This well-known case required the
Jaycees, a civic organization, to admit women into full
membership.27 Although the organization argued that such a
requirement violated its rights of free speech and expressive
association,277 the Court found that such rights are not absolute
but must yield to compelling state interests. Eliminating sex
discrimination was such an interest.278
Supporters of the gay group in Hurley assumed that the
state interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination
was as compelling as eliminating sex discrimination. Arguably,
the First Amendment rights of the offending parade organizers
were no greater than the Jaycees'. Observers expected the
Court to follow its own lead. Its failure to do so might suggest a
disregard for the problems of discrimination the gay
community faces. That explanation, however, renders even
more puzzling the outcome of Romer v. Evans,279 which held a
Colorado statute unconstitutional because it singled out
homosexuals for adverse treatment under the law.28° One
obvious difference between Hurley and Roberts, of course, is
that while sex is a quasi-suspect category, subject to higher
scrutiny, sexual orientation discrimination is subjected to only
rational basis scrutiny. This line of argument, however, is
noticeably absent from Hurley.
274 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
572-73 (1995).
275 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
276 Id. at 628.
277 Id. at 615.
278 Id. at 623.
279 517 U.S. 620 (1996). It should be noted that the Court's opinions on laws
specific to homosexuals are confused and unsettled. As Justice Scalia points out, the
decision in Romer contradicts the holding of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1984),
although Romer does not mention Bowers, much less explicitly overturn it. Romer, 517
U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'80 See Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality, 89 KY. L.J. 885 (2001).
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Dale Carpenter reconciles these cases by examining
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts.28' O'Connor
disapproved of the majority's test-that "the Jaycees' right of
association depends on the organization's making a
'substantial' showing that the admission of unwelcome
members 'will change the message communicated by the
group's speech"'2 2-- deeming it "both overprotective of activities
undeserving of constitutional shelter and underprotective of
important First Amendment concerns. " "2 Instead of the inquiry
"into the connection between membership and message,"2 she
favored a typological rule. An association "engaged exclusively
in protected expression" enjoys a "right to define its
membership ... ," while a commercial association merits "only
minimal constitutional protection."285 Roberts "present[ed] a
relatively easy case for application of the expressive-
commercial dichotomy" because the Jaycees fell comfortably
into the latter category. s6
Carpenter suggests that in subsequent opinions the
Court adopted O'Connor's rationale from Roberts, albeit
without explicitly invoking it. 287 For O'Connor's rationale to
apply to more than the simple cases, however, Carpenter
argues for the addition of a third category to the dichotomy:
"quasi-expressive associations."288 In ambiguous or analytically
difficult cases, judicial inquiry
should focus on the nature of the activity or internal operation
sought to be brought into compliance with anti-discrimination law. If
the activity or internal operation at issue is primarily expressive, the
activity or internal operation should generally be exempt from
compliance. If it is primarily commercial, it should not enjoy such an
exemption."
281 Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after
Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1564-66 (2001).
282 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
28 Id.
2' Id. at 633.
Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 638. "Notwithstanding its protected expressive activities, the
Jaycees-otherwise known as the Junior Chamber of Commerce-is, first and
foremost, an organization that, at both the national and local levels, promotes and
practices the art of solicitation and management." Id. at 639.
287 Carpenter, supra note 281, at 1570.
28 Id. at 1576.
Id. at 1576-77.
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For Carpenter "a large, general circulation newspaper is likely
a quasi-expressive association, mixing significant elements of
expression and commerce."29 ° In such cases, the commercial
aspects of the operation should yield to nondiscrimination laws
(consistent with Roberts), while the expressive dimensions
should not (hence the result of Hurley).
Since society announcements are often noneditorial-
because they usually lack editorial judgment and are motivated
primarily by commercial interests-they are commercial, not
expressive (especially if they are overtly fee-generating).
Consequently, consistent with Carpenter's approach, the
commercial activity of publishing union announcements should
be subject to nondiscrimination laws. Furthermore, when a
newspaper has expressed an editorial position favoring
nondiscrimination of homosexuals, the failure to include same-
sex union announcements in its society pages could not be an
editorial message meriting First Amendment protection.9 ' In
this case, Carpenter's tripartite model results in the conclusion
that the commercial and noneditorial aspects of the paper, here
including the society pages, should receive only minimal First
290 Id. at 1578.
291 This conclusion is extracted from the reasoning of Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000). A recurring argument in Dale concerns not only whether Dale was in
fact expressing the message attributed to him, but also whether the Boy Scouts were
indeed expressing the alleged contrary message, i.e., that scouting was incompatible
with being unembarrassed about being gay. Significantly, the Scouts had propounded
no such message as official policy before the issue began to be litigated. Lacking an
explicit declaration, the Scouts argued that that message of homosexual exclusion was
embedded in the general principles that a scout is to be "clean" and "morally straight."
Id. at 650. The Court dismissed this issue, stating that "it is not the role of the courts
to reject a group's expressed values . . . ." Id. at 651. The proper inquiry is only into the
"question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs." Id.
In Dale, the Court deferred to the organization's own statement "regarding
the nature of its expression . . . ." Id. at 652. The dissent's view was that, because the
Scouts are "silent on homosexuality" as far as official policy goes, they had no message
on the subject that Dale's presence would contradict. Id. at 684 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The lesson seems to be that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
message claimed by the organization. Where there is no such ambiguity, however, it
remains an open question whether the organization is entitled to this deference.
A newspaper could hardly claim that its omission of homosexuals from the
society pages constituted a "message" in the way that the exclusion of homosexuals
from the Scouts was construed to be expressive, if that same newspaper's editorial
pages are decrying the need for fair and equitable treatment of gay men and lesbians.
Certainly the explicit stance of the editorial pages should trump the silence of the
society pages, whenever a court needs to look to see what message the paper intends to
send. Whenever the messages are inconsistent, the explicit message should prevail. In
any situation, then, where a paper has expressed an editorial position favoring the
equitable treatment of gay men and lesbians, their omission from the society pages is
not a "message" in the sense protected by Hurley and Dale.
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Amendment protections from the speech and press clauses,
neither of which would suffice in these circumstances to trump
a local law prohibiting nondiscrimination.
5. Summary
No more editorial judgment goes into society
announcements in newspapers such as the Times-Picayune
than into their classified advertising-ascertaining that the
form is properly filled out, and reading it to make sure that it
contains appropriate and nonlibelous subject matter. As cases
such as Pittsburgh Press hold, classified ads can indeed be
subject to governmental regulation such as public
accommodations laws." ' Explicitly analogizing social
announcements to commercial speech like classified
advertisements bolsters the government's power to require
their equitable publication.
Applying Bezanson's three criteria,293 at least some
newspapers will fail and thereby fall outside the category of
"news" that the Free Press Clause was intended to protect.
Some papers fail to exercise the requisite retail-level judgment
because they are indiscriminate in the choice of
announcements to publish. Most announcements, however, are
non-news because the couple pays for publication, meaning
that publication involves the self-interest of the newspaper
rather than the necessary public good. A further, general
argument may also be made that no union announcements are
"news" because the benefit of publication always devolves on
private individuals instead of the public, and therefore even
when published for free and on a selective basis, every
announcement would still fail Bezanson's test.
Other tests may also apply. One standard could look to
what department of the newspaper handles announcements. If
union announcements come from the editorial department (the
"newsroom"), then they may be presumptively "news." If,
however, the advertising or classified department produces
them, then they likely are not "news."294 This standard has the
m Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973).
293 See supra Part IV.B.
'9 Newspapers themselves seem to recognize the distinction. "Unlike the
[New York] Times, engagements and wedding announcements are paid advertisements
at the [Dallas] Morning News, whereas the Times treats them as news items ....
Stuart Wilk, managing editor of the Morning News, explained that until this year
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advantage of respecting the classification established by the
newspaper itself. Of course, this standard would also allow
newspapers to adjust their practices to ensure First
Amendment protections.
Justice Stevens's dissent in New York Times Co., Inc. v.
Tasini suggests another possible standard.295 Tasini concerned
the relationship between a printed periodical and posting of
freelance articles to Electronic Databases. 9 Justice Stevens
noted that "[t]he record indicates that what is sent from the
New York Times to the Electronic Databases . . .is simply a
collection of ASCII text files representing the editorial content
of the New York Times for a particular day."297 If true and
generally valid, this fact would allow unequivocal assessment
of whether the newspaper regards announcements as editorial
content or something less. If editorial content, union
announcements would be included in the uploads of the print
version to the online databases such as Lexis and Westlaw (as
is the case with announcements published in the New York
Times). If announcements are not editorial content-i.e., they
are categorized with advertising content-then they will not be
uploaded. Although the Times-Picayune fails the test of retail-
level judgment, it does pass this "upload" test (i.e., at least
some of its wedding announcements can be retrieved through
Lexis), as well as the departmental test: according to its
website, union announcements are the responsibility of its
editorial department. Because all tests will not yield the same
result, the outcome in any specific adjudication would depend
on which test a court chose to apply.
In summary, plaintiffs can argue on numerous grounds
that announcements that run in most newspapers are not
strictly "news" of the sort the Free Press Clause was intended
to protect; therefore, announcements are susceptible to
engagement and wedding announcements were news items in the Morning News.
However, since they now run as ads, the news department is not involved in deciding
whether to follow the Times' lead in publishing same-sex commitment
announcements." Don Maines, Dallas Morning News Reviewing Same-Sex Union
Policy, DALLAS VOICE, Aug. 30, 2002, available at http://www.dallasvoice.com (last
visited Oct. 31, 2002). Another paper that, like the Morning News, has moved
announcements out of the newsroom and into the advertising department is the
Charlotte Observer. Cristina Breen & Ken Garfield, The Observer to Accept Same-Sex
Union Announcements, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/4109385.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
295 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
296 Id. at 487.
297 Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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discrimination claims. Indeed, newspaper organizations may
treat this type of material increasingly less like "news" and
more overtly like classified advertising, meaning that even if
announcements once enjoyed protected status as "news"
products, that outcome cannot be assumed today. The
newspaper should be required to present the necessary facts to
support any determination that union announcements are
protected "news." In all these scenarios, failure of the
announcements to rise to the standard of protected "news"
means that they are open to regulation by governmental
nondiscrimination ordinances under Pittsburgh Press.9
D. When Society Announcements are "News"
Although the above analysis, finding announcements to
be unprotectable for not being "news," arguably applies to most
social announcements, it does not describe all announcements.
Some newspapers, such as the New York Times, treat some
society announcements as true news articles; thus, the
argument in the preceding section does not resolve the problem
in this context. This Section considers whether government
regulation or civil action can compel newspapers to publish
same-sex union announcements, even when those
announcements qualify as news.
1. Announcements as Expressive Speech
Generally, society announcements do not rise to the
standard of "news" because of the mechanical and formulaic
method by which they are generated, and their lack of editorial
judgment and discretion. Other newspapers, however, treat
their society announcements the same as any other article.29
The New York Times reports as a news article at least ond
wedding per week.300 To the extent that that process of
29 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 391 (1973).
299 One example is the San Francisco Examiner.
If The Examiner ran wedding announcements for straight couples, I would of
course expect us also to run them for gay couples. But officially we don't run
wedding announcements at all, not of the humdrum variety.
The Examiner's society writer, Anne Lawrence, occasionally writes up
unions; she makes the judgment call of whether they're interesting enough to
include in her See and Be Scene column.
Morse, supra note 86.
300 One writer describes the Times notices this way:
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reporting, editing and publishing determines the classification
of the product, then at least some society announcements will
qualify as "news."
Some commentators reach a related conclusion that
although ordinary heterosexual announcements may or may
not qualify as "news," same-sex announcements necessarily
belong to that category. These writers argue that anything
openly gay is intrinsically a "message," even when there is no
intent, as in Hurley, to communicate anything other than
existence."' In Hurley, recall, the Court recognized a parade as
a uniquely expressive event,"' and as such entitled its
organizers to control the message that the event communicated
to bystanders."'
The Court took its Hurley analysis a further step in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale."4 In Dale, the Boy Scouts sought an
exemption from a New Jersey public accommodations law that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 5
The state interpreted that nondiscrimination law to compel the
Boy Scouts to reinstate a scoutmaster whose membership it
revoked after learning that he was homosexual.0 6 The Boy
Scouts argued that Hurley granted the right to exclude
homosexuals, because admitting them would send a message of
acceptance, which the Boy Scouts did not wish to convey.0 7 The
Court sided with the Boy Scouts. Dale's mere presence,
according to the Court, was sufficiently communicative to send
a message equal to that sent by the Hurley sign-carrying gay
paraders."°' As in Hurley, on the principle that speakers should
the [Times's] popular "Vows" column, which has, each week since 1992, taken
a particularly felicitous coupling and turned it into a soft-news story, these
wedding announcements were courtship narratives in miniature, each, like a
Jane Austen novel, ending at the moment when married life begins.
Rebecca Mead, Gay Old Times, NEW YORKER, Sept. 2, 2002, at 31.
301 Authors discussed in this Article who fall in this category are Todd Brower,
Nancy Knauer and Paul Siegel. See infra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
302 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
303 Id. at 558.
304 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
305 Id. at 644.
306 Id. at 645-46.
307 Id. at 647.
308 Todd Brower discusses in detail the relationship of Hurley to Dale, and
notes that for the Court, "the case turned on Dale's gay status, and not on his conduct,
advocacy, or beliefs." Todd Brower, Of Courts and Closets: A Doctrinal and Empirical
Analysis of Lesbian and Gay Identity in the Courts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 577
(2001). While in Hurley the immediate issue was whether a gay group could march in a
parade under its own banner, in Dale the problem was with who Dale was, not what he
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be allowed to control the message they send, the Court
permitted the Boy Scouts to exclude Dale."°9
Nancy Knauer agrees with the outcome of Dale and
articulates "the uniquely expressive character of the openly gay
individual",31 presumed by the Court. Both sides of the culture
war, she argues,
strongly agree on the expressive and distinctly political value of
openly gay role models-an openly gay individual sends a message of
gay pride, encourages others to embrace homosexuality, and puts an
ordinary face on homosexuality for the non-gay majority. Not
surprisingly, a central tenet of the pro-family anti-gay plank is to
silence positive articulations of gay identity, whereas pro-gay
organizations stress the importance of gay and lesbian visibility and
foster and encourage coming out as a personal and public good.8 1'
Knauer argued that because society has an embedded
assumption of "heteronormativity," defined as "the largely
unstated assumption that heterosexuality is the essential and
elemental ordering ... [principle] of society, " 312 the majority in
Dale rightly concluded that the unapologetic presence of an
"openly gay" individual indeed communicates a message.
Paul Siegel similarly argued that "[g]ay rights are, in
contemporary American society, a First Amendment issue.""3
He reasoned that "[e]xpressions of heterosexual personhood...
are 'favored socially and legally by tacitly being seen neither as
did. Given the emphasis put on language use in an earlier section, Part IA, supra, the
following insight is enlightening:
Rehnquist's language ... reinforces the dominance of identity over viewpoint
in Dale. He described Dale as "an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist
in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform." Dale's identity was gay first, activist
second, and scout third, if at all. Dale was not an assistant scoutmaster-he
simply wore the uniform of one as if he were a gay man in Boy Scout drag.
Now, contrast that description with the "heterosexual assistant
scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy." The
noun in that clause is "scoutmaster"; he is a scout first, one who merely holds
an opinion. The Court's rhetoric illustrates the asymmetry in its comparison
and dictates its result.
Id. at 594.
309 Dale, 530 U.S. at 654 ("[Tlhe presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout's choice not to propound a point of
view contrary to its beliefs.").
310 Knauer, supra note 46, at 997.
311 Id. at 1051-52. See also Bobbi Bernstein, Note, Power, Prejudice, and the
Right to Speak: Litigating "Outness" under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 269, 271-76 (1995) (discussing the importance of coming out).
312 Knauer, supra note 46, at 1020.
313 Siegel, supra note 185, at 251.
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sexual nor as speech' by virtue of their 'unremarkableness.' 'a4
He continued, "[wlhen one looks at a cavalcade of engagement
and wedding photos, it never even crosses one's mind to think
'gosh, what a slew of heterosexuals."'315 Public assertion "of gay
personhood, then, derives its free speech qualities precisely
from the unacceptability of same-sex conduct."31 If gay
expression today implicates free speech issues, says Siegel, that
may not be the case in the future when homosexuality is as
unremarkable as heterosexuality.317 Even if the free speech
dimension of gay expressivity is time-dependent, the fact
remains that today gay expression implicates free speech
issues in a way that heterosexual expression does not. 18
From this perspective, the facts of Dale present a
peculiar paradox. As Todd Brower pointed out,
New Jersey law gives all persons the right to employment and public
accommodations without discrimination because of sexual
orientation. However, there can be no discrimination because of
sexual orientation unless the person or organization knows of the
victim's orientation. Nevertheless, once the organization knows of
this identity, it may properly exclude that individual without
contravening antidiscrimination laws. Consequently, the sexual
orientation protections afforded under the law are effectively
nullified." 9
That is to say, because sexual orientation is invisible, one can
escape the assumption of heteronormativity only by speaking
about one's identity. Yet, under Dale, speaking out removes the
speaker from the protections of the antidiscrimination laws
when the speech implicates another's expression.
Consequently, antidiscrimination laws fail to protect
homosexuals because they only apply to situations where the
discrimination is not present because the individuals are not
known to be homosexuals. The effect of Dale is to "enshrine
314 Id.
315 Id. at 250-51 (quoting Richard Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom, 18
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43,97 (1987)).
316 Id. at 251.
317 See id.
311 See also Jennifer Minear, Note, Performance and Politics: An Argument for
Expanded First Amendment Protection of Homosexual Expression, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 601, 603 (2001) ("[Slelf-identification as a homosexual may be
constitutionally protected political expression.").
3 '9 Brower, supra note 308, at 582.
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[the] pressure [to remain closeted] into First Amendment
doctrine."3 °
According to Knauer and Siegel, the announcement of
same-sex unions communicates a message beyond the surface
content, one that is not included in most heterosexual
announcements (although a similar message might be
attributed to announcements from interracial couples for
largely these same reasons), and even one that may not be
intended by the submitter.321 By their analysis same-sex union
announcements qualify as "news" because they contain an
expressive message that ordinarily, under the holdings of
Hurley and Dale, a newspaper could not be compelled to carry.
Below, I consider whether policy grounds exist to carve out an
exception to these holdings in the case of newspapers, an
exception requiring compliance with governmental
antidiscrimination ordinances even when society
announcements fall into the category of "news."
2. Regulatory Precedents in Other Media
The government already exerts over broadcast media
the kind of regulatory control required to make social
announcements comply with antidiscrimination laws.
Examining social announcements in this light means that
using antidiscrimination laws to assure equitable access to
society pages is a matter of degree, and not of kind, and thus
hardly constitutes the "frontal assault on the First Amendment
freedoms generally and the freedom and independence of the
press in particular" that the Times-Picayune claimed.322
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,323 the Supreme
Court upheld a "fairness doctrine," similar to the right of reply
rejected in Tornillo,3 4 against arguments that the doctrine
infringed on broadcasters' First Amendment rights. The
element of the fairness doctrine at issue required radio
licensees to inform individuals or groups who were attacked on
320 Id. at 590.
321 See supra notes 308-18 and accompanying text.
322 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction Ex. B, Affadavit of James Amoss, at 2, Times Picayune Publ'g
Corp. v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ. A95-518N, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4842 (La. App.
4th Cir. April 13, 1995).
3 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
324 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see supra notes
238-47 and accompanying discussion.
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air and to provide the attacked individual or group a
reasonable opportunity to respond,325 at the broadcaster's
expense if necessary. 2 ' The Court justified the governmental
interference in broadcast programming content by relying on
the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. 27 Broadcast frequencies
in the 1960s, the time of the case, were limited. Only one user
could broadcast on a frequency at a time, necessitating
government regulation to establish order and prevent signal
interference. 28 Since the government licenses the frequencies,
they remain in a public trust rather than becoming the private
property of the licensee. 32 9 Because broadcast frequencies are a
limited public resource, this "difference[U in the characteristics
of new media justif[ied] differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them."3 ° In other words, broadcast media
can be regulated in a way that newspapers cannot, because
physical limits exist to the number of speakers who can access
the airwaves.
Motivating the scarcity conclusion was the "public
debate" interpretation of the First Amendment. The public
debate interpretation presumes that a vital democracy requires
an informed citizenry, and that the government must assure
that citizens have access to the information and viewpoints
necessary for the formation of intelligent political choices.331
Red Lion adopted this public debate understanding of the First
Amendment when it pronounced that "the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, . . . is
325 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-74. The fairness doctrine was repealed in 1987.
See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he fairness
doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public interest.")
(citing 2 FCC Rec. 5043, 5057 (1989)).
326 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377.
317 Id. at 383.
328 By the late 1980s the FCC concluded that spectrum scarcity was no longer
a problem, repealed the fairness doctrine and advocated returning spectrum to the free
market. For a thorough discussion of spectrum scarcity, see Fred H. Cate, The First
Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
27-34 (1995).
329 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383.
330 Id. at 386.
"' See Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for
Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1718-19
(1997) (describing the public debate model of the First Amendment); see also Post,
Constitutional Status, supra note 271, at 13 (reviewing the Meiklejohnian thesis that
"'the final aim' of the First Amendment freedom is to ensure the circulation of opinion
and information necessary for 'the voting of wise decisions.'"). See also supra note 247.
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paramount."332 "Speech" in this context "is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.""33
In a series of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
decisions,34 the Court upheld "set aside" and "must-carry"
provisions for cable television, again over protestations from
media representatives that these regulations interfered with
their editorial programming choices in contravention of their
First Amendment rights.335 Unlike in Red Lion, scarcity was
not an issue in these cases because there is no practical limit
on the number of stations a cable operator may provide.
Instead, the rationale for upholding these regulations derived
from the threat cable posed to the viability of broadcast
stations in markets where the cable network chose not to carry
the local over-air programming.336 The Court deemed the
burden of regulatory compliance on cable programming
minimal when compared to the interest in "preserv[ing] a
multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of
American households without cable." 37 The Court showed its
preference for the public debate interpretation of the First
Amendment: "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression ... Our political
system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."338 Significantly,
the Court applied a heightened scrutiny standard to consider
the issue, placing cable in the same category as print media
rather than broadcast media.339 The Court conceded that the
332 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. Admittedly, Red Lion also contains language
associated with the alternative First Amendment interpretation, the "absolutist" model
that adopts a laissez-faire policy toward the "marketplace of ideas." See Logan, supra
note 331, at 1716-18. Under this model the "truth will ultimatigy prevail" without any
governmental interference at all. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. Despite this apparent
confusion of rationales, the holding of Red Lion is consistent only with the public
debate model.
333 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-
75(1964)).
114 (Turner I) 512 U.S. 622 (1994); (Turner II) 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
331 Turner H, 520 U.S. at 188-89. The set aside provisions required cable
operators to provide a certain number of channels for public, educational and
governmental use, and to lease such channels at regular rates on a nondiscriminatory
basis. The must-carry provisions required cable operators to provide a portion of their
channels to local broadcast stations. Id. at 188.
336 Id. at 199.
331 Id. at 216.
33" Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 641.
339 Id. at 637-38.
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regulatory provisions constrained speech, but that not every
interference was impermissible.34°
The public debate interpretation warrants allowing
access not to all persons, but to all views. In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,' the Court justified government regulation of
"indecent" programming not on grounds that broadcast
frequencies are scarce, but because broadcast programming is
"uniquely pervasive."3 2 The criterion of "uniquely pervasive"
indicates yet another means by which government can regulate
content in media.
These cases demonstrate that First Amendment debate
no longer turns on whether the government can interfere with
publishers' decisions, but only when and to what extent that
interference is appropriate. Against the background of these
precedents, the question becomes whether the rationale for the
regulation of nonprint media could encompass the print media
as well.
The scarcity principle remains "the primary basis for
upholding the constitutionality of broadcast regulation,"3 3
despite attacks by academic commentators 44  and the
availability of alternative bases for the Court. Yet this scarcity
rationale for subjecting broadcast, but not print media, to
governmental regulations is today a fiction: 34' almost any
locality has far more broadcast outlets than it does
newspapers, typically three public broadcast channels to only
one daily newspaper.'46 If scarcity is truly the justification for
the differential regulation, then today's print media should be
regulated more heavily than broadcast so as to assure that
access to that limited resource is available to the widest
340 Id. at 636, 648.
341 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
342 Id. at 748.
343 Logan, supra note 331, at 1697.
344 Id. at 1700-01 (citing Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S.
Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 138 n.15 (1990)) ("[It is
fair to say that the [scarcity] rationale 'has lost credibility in the contemporary legal
literature.'").
345 New research continues to demonstrate that the broadcast frequency
spectrum is no longer a scarce public resource requiring regulation to assure equitable
access. In fact, today "a broadcaster has more space than is needed to transmit a
program," suggesting that continued reliance upon a regulatory scheme devised in
1927 will waste, not conserve the resource. Wendy M. Grossman, Radio Space: A
Renegade Plan to Show that Spectrum Isn't Scarce, 287(3) SCd. AM. 29 (2002).
346 Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 207.
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possible audience.347  Beyond this bluntly empirical
contradiction between the perception and the fact of scarcity,
however, is the more philosophical realization that even in the
abstract, "scarcity is a universal fact, [one that] can hardly
explain regulation in one context and not another. The attempt
to use a universal fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily
leads to analytical confusion."348 Under this analysis, if
broadcast frequencies are scarce, so too are "the newsprint, ink,
delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the
production and dissemination of print journalism."49
Finally, all signs point to an increased tendency to
regulate broadcast media, including the Internet. 35' This forces
the conclusion that if regulatory schemes were to merge
because of the lack of any reasoned basis to sustain the
distinction, print would come under the regulatory umbrella
currently shouldered by broadcast media,351 and not vice-versa.
One can, in fact, see some signs that government
already mandates some content in print media, suggesting that
this Rubicon has already been crossed. The regulation of
society pages considered here is different from the regulation
that already exists, but again only in degree and not in kind.
Courts and legislatures both behave at times as though local
newspapers are resources at their disposal. A recent example
occurred in Ohio: "A couple who had sex on a popular lakeside
beach .. .were ordered by a judge to apologize to shocked
beachgoers in newspaper advertisements, or go to jail."352 There,
the court ordered a newspaper to carry content, but the paper
was reimbursed for the costs by the content provider (i.e., the
'4' The economics of establishing a competing newspaper are today
prohibitive. See id. at 211 ("Until these economic facts change, competing newspapers
are not going to spring up, whatever the theoretical possibility that they might do so.").
To the extent that the freedom of the press from regulation was originally based upon
the presumed ease of entering the media marketplace with a competing message, that
rationale is no longer valid. In this context, see CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 159 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[I]n practical terms the
newspapers and magazines, like TV and radio, are also available only to a select few.").
348 Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
34 Id.
"5 See, e.g., Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
35' This merging of media regulation could not occur without some significant
overhauls of existing rules. "Tornillo embraced a Fourth Estate checking model and
rejected the right-to-know model for the print media. It thus stands as a bar to
imposing broadcast-like obligations on the press." POWE, supra note 236, at 248.
352 Pair Must Run Ads as Apology for Beach Sex, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
June 29, 2002, at A10 (emphasis added).
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in flagrante beachgoers). Is the newspaper free to reject the ad
on free speech grounds, even though that rejection means jail
time for the couple? The court seemed to think not, and the
paper registered no objection on principle to the compelled
speech.
Legislatures take similar liberties. Many versions of
state Megan's laws require community notification through
publication by convicted sex offenders of the offenders' pictures
and addresses in local newspapers."' Again, the First
Amendment issue is whether papers are free to reject these
statutorily mandated notices, particularly if a paper feels that
the notices convey a message not suitable for their audiences.
Municipal or state ordinances prohibiting
discrimination in society pages will have the effect of inserting
government into decisions made by newspapers. But similar
regulation already pervades other media, and the barrier
purportedly distinguishing these other media from the
sacrosanct print media is today irrelevant. At best, all media
face scarcity, and if a discrepancy exists, it favors regulation of
print rather than deregulation of broadcast media. Moreover,
at least minor precedent already exists for just such
governmental mandate of newspaper content. The only
remaining issue, then, is whether the government can take the
final step and prohibit discrimination in the publication of
union announcements, and on what basis.
3. Newspapers as Public Fora
Charles Logan recognized the tenuous place of the
scarcity rationale in First Amendment analysis,"' prompting
him to seek a replacement justification for the regulation of
broadcast media. This justification he found in the public forum
doctrine,355 which holds that public property must, under
reasonable conditions and within well-established bounds, be
open for people to gather and exchange ideas. If he is correct,
30 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(B)(2)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (The
offender shall give notice "published on two separate days within the applicable period
provided for herein, without cost to the state, in the official journal of the governing
authority of the parish where the defendant plans to reside and, if ordered by the
sheriff or police department, in a newspaper which meets the requirements of R.S.
43:140(3).... ").
35 See Logan, supra note 331.
311 Id. at 1714 ("The public forum doctrine thus provides an independent basis
for upholding broadcast regulation under the First Amendment.").
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and the public forum analysis can support the current practice
of regulating broadcast media, then to the extent that
newspapers-or more specifically, parts of newspapers-act as
a public forum, they could be subject to limited governmental
regulation over certain aspects of their content. This Section
plumbs the possible merits of this argument.56
a. Public Forum Analysis
The suggestion that the public forum doctrine could
help to illuminate this discussion seemingly crashes on the
simple fact that the public forum doctrine applies only to public
fora, and newspapers, being privately owned businesses, are
clearly outside this category. While this assumption certainly
captures the conventional understanding of the doctrine as
articulated by the Supreme Court,5 the public forum doctrine
is sufficiently complex and problematic that such a simple
assertion may belie the implicit unifying intuition binding the
disparate instantiations of the doctrine. The present Section
presents an alternative to the conventional, property-oriented
understanding of the public forum doctrine.
In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n,3 8 the Supreme Court reviewed the public forum doctrine
under a free speech analysis. The Court identified three kinds
of fora, and the level of judicial scrutiny appropriate to each.
First are the traditional fora: "places which by long tradition or
by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,
[wherein] the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are
sharply circumscribed."359 Speech in these fora may be limited
only by "regulations of the time, place and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication."36 °
At the other extreme is the nonpublic forum, which "the
state may reserve ... for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
35 In fairness to Logan, he probably would not support this extended
application of his thesis. See id. at 1714-15.
357 The public forum doctrine is articulated by the Supreme Court in Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
358 Id.
359 Id. at 45.
360 Id.
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and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view."" Finally, between the
traditional and nonpublic fora are the "limited public fora."
These properties are not traditional public fora, but the state
may open them to serve that function. This decision is
discretionary, but as long as the forum exists the state "is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public
forum."362
Robert Post has characterized the problematic nature of
the public forum doctrine as arising largely from its
development "in a manner heedless of its constitutional
foundations."363  Illustrating the removal of public forum
analysis from the constitutional framework is a post-Perry
case, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc.364 The Cornelius Court explained that
[tihe government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has
looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to
365
assembly and debate as a public forum.
This statement, Post acknowledges, has
the virtue of candor, for it tactfully withdrew the concept of the
limited public forum as a meaningful category of constitutional
analysis. If a limited public forum is neither more nor less than what
the government intends it to be, than a first amendment [sic] right of
access to the forum is nothing more than the claim that the
government should be required to do what it already intends to do in
366
any event.
This example is instructive because, according to Logan,
broadcast media should be analyzed as limited public fora,367 a
category that Post concludes is empty for purposes of
constitutional analysis. More generally, the example illustrates
361 Id. at 46.
311 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
l d See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987). Other scholars
have similarly critiqued the public forum doctrine. See also Steven G. Gey, Reopening
the Public Forum: From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998).
NA 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
365 Id. at 802.
36 Post, supra note 363, at 1756-57.
367 See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
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the nuances one finds in any attempt to understand the public
forum doctrine in the abstract, much less when one attempts to
apply the doctrine to a novel situation.
The problem with contemporary public forum doctrine,
Post suggests, is its reliance on a distinction that lacks any
articulated relationship to the First Amendment principles at
issue.368 Instead of a misplaced emphasis on the "substantive
power" of government ownership,'69 the more meaningful vector
of analysis in public forum cases has been
to decide whether a resource is subject to a kind of authority "like"
that characterized by the government's relationship to a newspaper
editorial, which is to say like that involved in the governance of the
general public, or whether it is subject to a kind of authority "like"
that characterized by the government's control over the internal
management of its own institutions, which is say to the authority of
370
management.
Critical for present purposes is Post's conclusion that
"[p]ublic forum doctrine is conventionally, although
'inaccurately, understood to be pertinent only when the public
seeks to use government property for expressive purposes."37' If
the government's relationship to the forum is "managerial,"
then the rational basis level of scrutiny for nonpublic fora is
appropriate. If, however, "the government exercises the
authority of governance over a resource which a member of the
general public wishes to use for communicative purposes, the
resource is a public forum.
3
1
2
Taken together, Logan's and Post's arguments offer the
following result: Communication media can be governmentally
regulated to the extent they are subject to the public forum
doctrine. "Public" refers not to governmental ownership, but
rather to the degree of control the government exercises over
the resource. The state may have a governing relationship over
newspapers, as decisions such as Ragin and Pittsburgh Press
suggest: those cases allowed the government to impose
negative restrictions on what newspapers can publish in
sections not containing protected expressive speech.3 3 In other
36 Post, supra note 363, at 1777.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 1782 (emphasis added).
371 Id. at 1797.
372 Id. at 1717.
373 Pittsburgh Press Co., v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 391 (1973) (holding that an order prohibiting sex-designated employment
2003]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
words, while the government cannot tell them what they must
do, it can tell them what they cannot do, i.e., violate
antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, the government could
regulate newspapers under the public forum doctrine in a way
that will assure nondiscriminatory access to the society pages.
If a newspaper chooses to publish announcements, it cannot
restrict those announcements on the basis of the kind of
announcement that it is (e.g., interracial, same-sex). This
result furthers the broad Red Lion principle that "[t]here is no
sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private
censorship operating in a medium not open to all. 'Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First
Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by
private interests.'374
b. Newspapers as "Quasi-Public"
Newspapers may fall under the public forum doctrine if,
as Post argues, "public" is understood in his nonconventional
sense of a contrast between managerial and governance
relationships. The same result, however, can be achieved by
bringing newspapers within the more ordinary expectation of
what kinds of things fall into the category of "public."31 Two
lines of court decisions have extended the category of "public"
to include some kinds of private property.376
advertising columns does not infringe the First Amendment rights of newspapers);
Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1003-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that application
of the Fair Housing Act to newspapers did not violate the First Amendment).
374 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (quoting Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). For a forceful argument that private
ownership should not obstruct a right of access to press outlets, see Jerome A. Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
375 Other means may exist to extend public forum analysis in a way that
would be useful to this analysis. For example, some cases have invoked a "public
thoroughfare" analogy to extend the category of the public forum beyond the traditional
arenas of streets and sidewalks. See, e.g., Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v.
Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D.R.I. 1976). One could
construct a plausible argument to characterize newspapers as metaphysical "public
thoroughfares."
376 Hurley is not as helpful in extending the category of "public" as it could
have been, but this time it is the plaintiffs and not the Court's fault. In the original
complaint, the plaintiff argued that the parade organizer was a de facto governmental
actor, and in this sense it, too, was "public" despite being technically private. See
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
566 (1995). If that characterization were granted, then the plaintiff could have asserted
its own First Amendment claims against the exclusionary state action if it could have
argued that the state had created a limited public forum from which the plaintiff was
being excluded based on its viewpoint. This cause of action is not available against
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i. From Marsh to PruneYard
The first line of case law that construes some private
property, in some contexts, as "public" builds upon the holding
of Marsh v. Alabama.377 In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness was
prevented from distributing religious literature on the grounds
of the company town of Chickasaw. Had Chickasaw been a
municipal corporation, the prohibition would have been clearly
unconstitutional. 37" The issue, therefore, was whether the fact
that a private company had legal title to the town required a
different result.
The Court said no and expressed its decision in
sweeping, principled language. "Ownership," it said, "does not
always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
75
Moreover, the Court's reasoning drew on the public debate
understanding of the First Amendment: "To act as good
citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be
purely private conduct. See id.
The record certainly provides ample reason to accept this characterization
of the parade organizer as a de facto government actor: Although the city originally
sponsored the parade, in 1947 it authorized a specific private organization to serve this
function. Id. at 560. Along with that authority came financial support, public printing
services and rights to use the city's official seal. Id. at 561. This entanglement ceased
only after 1992, which was the same time that the gay and lesbian marchers first sued
to be included in the event. Id. The trial court rejected the characterization of the
parade as state action, and the plaintiffs, even when questioned on this matter at oral
argument before the Supreme Court, chose "not [to] press that issue [tihere." Id. at
566.
I, at least, believe that had the plaintiffs accepted this invitation to
reintroduce this issue, the outcome of the case may well have been different. I also
believe that a similar oversight marred the argument in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000). While the decision treated the Boy Scouts as fundamentally a
private organization, the crux of the argument was that, given the amount of public
assistance the Boy Scouts receive, it is not a private organization, but a public one. The
Boy Scouts argued successfully that their organization should have the benefits of
public financial and other support while retaining private status, including the right to
discriminate.
Notably, the Hurley Court did not hold that the entwined interests of the
city and the parade organizers, such as they were, failed to make the parade a public
event; the Court merely deferred to the plaintiffs decision not to argue that point, and
instead based its decision on public accommodations law. The way is thus open to
argue that some links between public and private, perhaps even less substantial than
were present in Hurley, could still serve to render the society pages of a newspaper a
'public forum" for present purposes.
377 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
178 Id. at 504.
171 Id. at 506.
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properly informed their information must be uncensored."3"0
For these reasons the town of Chickasaw, despite being private
property, was subject to the same restrictions on limiting
liberties as burden a public town."'
On its own, Marsh might have supported an argument
that a newspaper, because it is essential to the formation of an
informed citizenry, and because it has opened itself up for use
by the public in the form of advertising and announcements, is
therefore compelled to respect the free speech right of access to
this public forum. But the later cases that most directly
invoked Marsh moved in another direction. Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
12
applied the Marsh arguments to require a shopping center to
allow picketing on its private property.83 The Court, in Lloyd
Corp v. Tanner,"4  later limited the Logan holding,
distinguishing between the activities involved in the two cases.
Whereas the picketing in Logan was directed toward the
shopping center itself, the impermissible activity in Lloyd was
general leafleting on private property.8 5 In Hudgens v.
NLRB," 6 the Court then interpreted Lloyd as not merely
distinguishable from Logan, but as overruling it, because "the
Lloyd opinion incorporate[d] lengthy excerpts from two of the
dissenting opinions in Logan Valley," and thus amounts to a
"total rejection" of its holding.87
The Supreme Court finally settled, in PruneYard
388Shopping Center v. Robins, on a rule that the federal
Constitution provides no basis for requiring private property
owners to allow unapproved exercise of individual speech
rights, even when that property is opened to public use.389
However, the federal Constitution does not prevent state law
310 Id. at 508.
38 Id. at 509.
382 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
113 Id. at 319 ("We see no reason why access to a business district in a
company town for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights should be
constitutionally required, while access for the same purpose to property functioning as
a business district should be limited simply because the property surrounding the
'business district' is not under the same ownership.").
384 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
38 Id. at 564.
38 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
... Id. at 518.
38 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
389 Id. at 79.
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from requiring that same access, 390 at least for some kinds of
property.
ii. Quasi-Public Entities
A more promising argument that some kinds of private
property can be subject to burdens normally associated with
public properties concerns the category of the quasi-public. A
"quasi-public" corporation is defined as a "for-profit corporation
providing an essential public service."39' Examples of typical
quasi-public entities include banks,392 hospitals3 93 and utilities
such as telephones, electricity and water. 94 Classification of an
entity as quasi-public subjects the corporation, despite being
privately owned, to greater governmental regulation, as would
be expected given the function of the entity to provide "an
essential public service."
If one accepts the public debate interpretation of the
First Amendment a newspaper clearly provides just such an
essential public service. The healthy maintenance of our
participatory democracy requires an informed citizenry. The
role of the newspaper within the community is to foster debate
and to provide vital information about the community, nation
and world that will allow the reader to form intelligent
opinions about topics of public interest. If that description of
the newspaper's role is valid, then the paper provides a service
essential to the public good and consequently qualifies as a
quasi-public entity.95 Under this theory, as a consequence of
this quasi-public status, the government can regulate
newspapers to assure access to this forum on a
nondiscriminatory basis, even as to the society pages.
Several courts have noted that newspapers have
precisely the quasi-public status proposed here. In Herald Co.
v. Seawell,399 the Tenth Circuit, when considering a derivative
suit over the treatment of stock, had this to say:
390 Id. at 88.
39' BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 344 (7th ed. 1999).
392 Id. at 139.
393 Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969
(Alaska 1997).
39 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 344, 1544 (7th ed. 1999).
395 But note Justice Stewart's skepticism on this point when he mused
whether "[tlhe press should be relegated to the status of a public utility." Stewart,
supra note 247, at 636.
39 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
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A corporation publishing a newspaper such as the Denver Post
certainly has other obligations besides the making of profit. It has an
obligation to the public, that is, the thousands of people who buy the
paper, read it, and rely upon its contents. Such a newspaper is
endowed with an important public interest. It must adhere to the
ethics of the great profession of journalism. The readers are entitled
to a high quality of accurate news coverage of local, state, national,
and international events. The newspaper management has an
obligation to assume leadership, when needed for the betterment of
the area served by the newspaper. Because of these relations with
the public, a corporation publishing a great newspaper such as the
Denver Post is, in effect, a quasi-public institution. 7
More than fifty years earlier, an Ohio court in the case of
Uhlman v. Sherman398 delved even deeper into the issue.
Uhlman concerned a complaint by a businessman that the
community newspaper had refused to accept his advertisement.
Bearing in mind the Supreme Court's observation that
"[p]roperty does become clothed with a public interest, when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect
the community at large,"399 the Uhlman court addressed the
claim that the newspaper was "so 'affected with public interest'
that it is a quasi public corporation."40 Among the factors
considered were the implications of statutes requiring
publication of notices in community newspapers. Noting that
the statutes allowed for alternatives by permitting a particular
qualifying newspaper to refuse the required notices, the court
concluded that the statutes did not contemplate that "all
newspapers [meeting the statutory requirements] should
refuse to publish such 'ads."'' Holding that a newspaper that
has opened its pages to advertising had no right to discriminate
against a submission that complied with its published criteria,
the court noted
that the growth and extent of the newspaper business, the public
favors and general patronage received by the publishers from the
public, and the general dependence, interest and concern of the
public in their home papers, has clothed this particular business
with a public interest and rendered them amenable to reasonable
regulations and demands of the public.40 '
... Id. at 1094-95.
398 1919 WL 1009 (Ohio C.P. 1919).
'99 Id. at *4 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)).
400 Id. at *2.
401 Id. at *5.
402 Id. at *6.
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Seawell, Uhlman and other decisions"3 demonstrate the
reasonableness of the treatment of newspapers as quasi-public
corporations."' As a quasi-public entity, a newspaper cannot
discriminate against persons who comply with its submission
criteria, especially where local laws and ordinances expressly
forbid that kind of discrimination. 40 5 Even more generally,
recognizing newspapers as quasi-public entities counters the
argument that they are privately owned and are therefore not
"public," thereby removing the largest obstacle to the
application of public forum doctrine to newspapers.
CONCLUSION
The battle for same-sex marriage has been long and
hard-fought, and much opposition yet remains. When the
Vermont Supreme Court held that under the state's
constitution same-sex couples cannot be denied "the statutory
benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex
who choose to marry,"4 6 Gary Bauer, then a conservative GOP
presidential hopeful, unfavorably compared the decision with
an act of terrorism.' °7 That statement, read now in a post-
September 11 world, blatantly displays the depth of the
resistance.
Same-sex union announcements have a central role to
play in these debates. On one level, they show to the world a
side of gay relationships it often does not see, that they can be
committed, stable and frankly quite ordinary. On another, they
help to elicit the social responses that contribute to the
healthful maintenance of those relationships during the peaks
and valleys endured by all romantic couples. Newspapers
403 See, e.g., Los Angeles Daily News, 19 Lab. Arb. 39 (1952) (upholding firing
of suspected Communist Party members on the ground that a newspaper has "a quasi-
public responsibility in that the newspaper, in discharging its obligations to the public,
must print the news and without bias .... "); United Press Ass'n, 22 Lab. Arb. 679
(1954).
404 Accord Barron, supra note 374, at 1669 ("[I]f parks in private hands cannot
escape the stigma of abiding 'public character,' it would seem that a newspaper, which
is the common journal of printed communication in a community, could not escape the
constitutional restrictions which quasi-public status invites. If monopoly newspapers
are indeed quasi-public, their refusal of space to particular viewpoints is state action
abridging expression in violation of even the romantic view of the first amendment.").
405 The Times-Picayune, even today, does not specify in its submission criteria
that the couple must be heterosexual.
406 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). See also supra note 118.
407 Elaine Herscher, Candidates Out of the Closet on Gay Issues, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 25, 2000, at Al.
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increasingly appear willing to allow gay couples to attain these
social intangibles through access to their society pages. But of
the estimated 1,600 metropolitan newspapers, only about 180
are known to have opened their announcements sections to gay
men and lesbians. More, certainly, will follow the example set
by the New York Times. But others, like the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, have remained adamant in their refusal, and
these newspapers can expect legal action by the aggrieved
parties. Because the intangible of public recognition is so very
important, it is worth fighting for, and, when necessary, merits
the energy and resources to persuade newspapers to publish
announcements on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Whether this outcome can be realized depends on the
unique factual setting in which each refusal to publish occurs.
The threshold consideration is whether there exists a public
accommodations law that prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, and whether that law can be applied to
newspapers. If that criterion is met, the next step is to ask how
announcements in that newspaper are to be categorized, either
as editorial "news" or as noneditorial speech analogous to
commercial advertising.
The Free Press Clause protects editorial judgment
embodied in "news." Bezanson presented three criteria to be
satisfied before granting material these free press protections.
If little editorial judgment is exercised over the
announcement's creation, then it should be excluded from the
class of editorial speech that the Free Press Clause and
Tornillo 8 are intended to protect. Further, the mixture of
commercial and expressive content of newspapers can render
them vulnerable to the bifurcated analysis articulated by
Justice O'Connor in Roberts,"' and which Dale Carpenter has
expanded into three categories. All told, when a court deems
society announcements noneditorial speech, they should be
subject to antidiscrimination regulation by public
accommodations laws. Under most criteria discussed in this
Article, the Times-Picayune satisfies the conditions for
mandated publication of union announcements.
In other environments, however, society announcements
will qualify as "news" because they do evidence editorial
judgment in their creation. Moreover, some writers argue that
408 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
409 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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same-sex declarations of this type are intrinsically expressive
and political speech. By either standard, a different analysis is
required in these contexts, one that centers on the Free Speech
Clause and its protection of the newspaper's expressive
content. That barrier falls, however, when newspapers are
construed to be quasi-public corporations, and therefore subject
to scrutiny as public fora. Here again, the First Amendment
should not shield newspapers from reasonable regulation of
generally applicable antidiscrimination regulations.
As a result, most of the arguments that newspapers
traditionally employ to shield them from the requirement to
publish are not as impenetrable as they might hope. Some
newspapers will be especially vulnerable to governmental
oversight because of the locally variable conditions that define
public accommodations to include newspapers. Others will be
vulnerable because their internal procedures minimize the
editorial judgment involved in publication decisions.
Specifically, they publish all that they receive, and compose the
announcements according to routine formula, or even take the
announcements directly from the submitters.
Other newspapers, concededly, will be more protected
on these considerations. Those newspapers exist in
jurisdictions whose public accommodation laws cannot be
extended to include newspapers, they publish announcements
only on a genuinely selective basis, and the announcements
they do publish reflect substantial editorial judgment. The New
York Times inhabits this end of the spectrum, adding to the
irony that it should be this paper that has lead the way. Of all
newspapers, the Times was particularly free to rebuff the
request to publish union announcements, but it chose to
publish, perhaps recognizing that the time has come for
equality in public recognition of all committed relationships.
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